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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines constitutional political opinions among the members of provincial 
and district zemstvos in Russia, in order to explain this group’s rejection of liberal 
political parties in the first two Dumas. It finds that the rejection of these parties was not 
entirely synonymous with a rejection of liberal constitutional ideas among the zemstvo 
rank and file, who exhibited support for constitutionalism in three main areas. Firstly, 
arguments advanced against land expropriation among the zemstvo rank and file were 
based upon the desire to reinforce economic individualism amongst the peasantry, 
which was considered to be an essential basis for a constitutional regime. Secondly, the 
zemstvo rank and file supported a Duma elected upon a restricted franchise that would 
play a role in the political modernization of the peasantry in order to encourage norms 
of constructive political participation and reduce the popularity of extremist parties. 
Finally, government repression was criticized on the basis that it contravened notions of 
law and due process. Evidence from the southern provinces suggests that repression was 
valued for its role in restoring law and order, although the legality of the repression was 
still criticized. These findings suggest that the landed nobility who made up the majority 
of the members of the provincial and district zemstvos were more supportive of 
constitutional reform in Russia than has previously been suggested, which is significant 
to historical debates surrounding the stability of the tsarist regime before the First World 
War. 
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
  
 
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this 
dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other 
degree at The University of York or any other institution.
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In March 1906 the British vice-consul to Odessa, V. H. Bosanquet, reported that there 
had been widespread peasant unrest in Saratov province as a result of the chronic 
shortage of land available to the peasants. The following account of an example of the 
resulting governmental repression was established by Bosanquet on the basis of 
accounts from landowners who had fled to the local towns.  
 
Cossacks were sent to suppress the disorders, and they have seemed to have flogged the 
peasants mercilessly. I was told of a case where Cossacks (by order of the zemstvo 
nachalnik, if I remember right) beat the peasants of the soles of their feet so severely that 
some died and others were taken to hospital. I was further informed that many peasants 
had been killed by Cossacks.1 
 
This report of brutal government action in the provinces is indicative of a new trend in 
political thought among the aristocratic landed proprietors of Russia’s provinces. 
Accounts of brutal punishment resulting in the death of peasants is presented as 
illegitimate, especially as it was carried out  arbitrarily on the orders of the zemstvo 
nachalnik, or land captain, a representative of the tsarist bureaucracy in the countryside. 
This represents an interesting concern for the due operation of law and order in the 
countryside, even where repression was acting in the landowners’ interests. In asserting 
the right of the peasantry to enjoy the due process of the law, this passage also raises the 
possibility that the peasantry were also thought of to deserve rights and freedoms that 
citizens of a constitutional regime would be entitled to. 
 
This dissertation will examine the rejection of the Kadet and Octobrist parties among 
the provincial and district zemstvos in 1906 during the revolution of 1905-1907. In 
almost a single stroke, in that year’s zemstvo elections most Kadet deputies lost the 
seats in the zemstvos. By the end of the decade, the Kadets had been completely 
eliminated from the zemstvos, after their leaders had dominated the gentry’s opposition 
within the zemstvos up to the formation of political parties. The political opinions of the 
zemstvo rank and file during the revolution of 1905 to 1907 will be studied in order to 
determine whether this rejection of liberal political parties represented a rejection of 
liberal and constitutional politics by the zemstvo rank and file, or if a more complex 
                                                     
1 The National Archives, Kew, FO 881/8755, no. 22, Vice-Consul V. H. Bosanquet to Consul-General C. 
Smith, March 12 1906, 64. 
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picture emerges where the zemstvo rank and file merely rejected the particular Kadet 
brand of liberalism, retaining aspects of support for constitutional reform for Russia.  
 
The revolutionary period of 1905-1907, in which this investigation will be situated, 
arguably set the precedent for the interaction and cooperation between the emerging 
civil society and the state in order to implement constitutional reform. Faced with 
revolutionary uprisings in major urban centers, rampant peasant unrest in the 
countryside, and organized campaigns for constitutional reform from educated sections 
of society, the government granted the concession of the Duma along with new laws for 
greater accountability of government to Russian society. The extent to which 
constitutional reform resulted in an increase in cooperation between civil society and 
the Russian government can be investigated by studying the development of 
constitutional thought in the zemstvos, with a view to establishing if there existed a 
movement for moderate political change that would have been compatible with the 
Russian government. 
 
 
The Zemstvos in 1905 
 
The zemstvo rank and file represented a minority of the Russian population. However, it 
should not be assumed that this group was homogeneous in its social and political 
outlook. There existed a variety of different opinions on the welfare of the peasantry, 
civil liberties, and the role of a representative institution within this group, alongside 
significant socio-economic variation. The opinions expressed by this group in response 
to a government survey on rural problems in 1894 demonstrates such variety of 
opinion,2 as does the intellectual output of the members of the Beseda group at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, which was based upon the exposition of broad 
principles as opposed to specific methods that may have led to divisions within the early 
zemstvo movement.3 There were also a range of interest groups formed by the members 
of the landed gentry that sat on the zemstvos. Foremost among these was the United 
Nobility, which was formed in 1906 to oppose land expropriation but later lobbied the 
                                                     
2 Thomas Fallows, ‘The Russian Fronde and the Zemstvo Movement: Economic Agitation and Gentry 
Politics in the Mid-1890s’, Russian Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (1985), 135. 
3 Terrence Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), 28. 
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government on other conservative issues, and represented the richest segment of the 
landed nobility.4  
 
The nobility that sat on the zemstvos in different provinces in Russia would have had 
different economic priorities, and therefore different political views. For example, the 
nobility in the southern black earth region would have been more engaged in farming 
than the nobility which sat on the zemstvos in the northern forested regions due to the 
relative fertility of farming in the former area.5 There was also a significant 
diversification in wealth among the Russian nobility still attached to the land. Of the 39 
percent of the noble estate that still possessed land in 1905, 23 percent owned one to 
100 desiatinas of land, 13 percent owned 101 to 1,000 desiatinas, and three percent 
owning over 1,000 desiatinas.6 Therefore, in light of significant political and economic 
diversification of the landed gentry who sat on zemstvo boards, references to the 
zemstvo rank and file as a whole are problematical. However, this shorthand represents 
the best approximation that can be achieved in the absence of detailed sources on the 
political opinions of this group, such as a detailed corpus of memoir material. 
 
The zemstvos represent a unique institution for studying the role of Russian civil 
society and its interaction with the government during the revolutionary period of 1905-
1907. Established in 1864, and comprised of a system of district zemstvos and a 
provincial zemstvo per province, the zemstvos played key public roles in the 
administration of the 34 Russian provinces in which they were established. They were 
tasked with the maintenance of roads, bridges, hospitals and schools, and employed 
agronomists.7 The zemstvos gradually accumulated more powers over the countryside 
up to the period in question. The provisions of 1890 gave the zemstvos control over a 
much broader range of local issues; the original 1864 statute had defined the powers of 
the zemstvos as the management of ‘local economic and welfare needs’, whereas the 
                                                     
4 Seymore Becker, ‘A Conservative Lobby: the United Nobility 1905-1910’, Kritika vol. 5, no. 1 (2004), 
114; Roberta Maning, The Crisis of the Old order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), 233.  
5 David Moon, ‘Peasants and Agriculture’, in D. Lieven, (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia. Vol. 2, 
Imperial Russia, 1689-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 369. 
6 Seymore Becker, Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1985), 39. 
7 ‘The Zemstvo Statutes of 1 January, 1864’, in G. Vernadsky (ed.), A Source Book for Russian History 
from Early Times to 1917, vol. 3 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 613-14. 
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1890 statute omitted the word ‘economic’, which McKenzie suggested reflected a 
recognition of a broader scope of zemstvo activities.8 
 
The zemstvos consisted of elected officials who set overall zemstvo policy, and 
employed various professionals such as teachers, doctors, and agronomists. The elected 
officials consisted mainly of the local landed gentry. Although property requirements 
for candidacy and voting had been initially set relatively low, in an attempt to prop up 
the landed gentry the government modified the zemstvo statutes to effectively exclude 
all but the richest peasants from the zemstvos. Research by Atkinson has also suggested 
that peasants who did sit on the zemstvos often owed their positions in some way to the 
local authorities, were unused to asserting their rights, and often did not understand 
technical terms, and as a result did not tend to take autonomous positions in zemstvo 
meetings.9 In contrast, from the beginning of the 1890s there was an increase in gentry 
engagement with the zemstvos, in comparison to the habitual absenteeism and apathy of 
previous years.10  
 
The landed gentry sitting on zemstvo boards in the provinces differed from the members 
of the zemstvo constitutionalist movement in several socio-economic areas. Over the 
course of the late nineteenth century, the emancipation of 1861 had fractured the 
Russian nobility, and noble landholding had fallen significantly by 1905.11 This process 
has often been attributed to the nobility not being able to effectively run their estates in 
the post emancipation period and falling heavily into debt, although while the 
proportion of noble land fell, the relative value of land held by the nobility in the period 
rose.12 An important survey of the Russian nobility after emancipation has also shown 
that this group often recycled their capital into other projects such as industry, bringing 
into contention the notion that the Russian nobility as a social group was in a period of 
crisis.13 Members of the nobility who retained their land took on a new agricultural-
centric outlook; there is evidence that they devoted more time to their estates, changed 
                                                     
8 Kermit McKenzie, ‘Zemstvo Organisation and Role within the Administrative Structure’, in T. Emmons 
and W. Vucinich (eds.), The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 45. 
9 Dorothy Atkinson, ‘The Zemstvo and the Peasantry’, in Terrence Emmons and Wayne Vucinich (eds.), 
The Zemstvo in Russia: an Experiment in Self-Government ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 117-8. 
10 Roberta Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), 46. 
11 Becker, Nobility and Privilege, 29. 
12 Terrence Emmons, ‘The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics’, Russian Review vol. 33, no. 3 (1974), 
273. 
13 Becker, Nobility and Privilege, 31. 
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child-rearing practices, and expressed desires for more autonomy from St Petersburg in 
memoirs.14 They also frequently contrasted their work in the zemstvos to that of the 
state.15 In contrast, members of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists tended to practice 
professions such as law, and were less connected with agriculture. 
 
 
Zemstvo Activity up to 1905 
 
The revolution of 1905-7 represented the nadir of the development of oppositional and 
constitutionalist activity within the zemstvos since the 1860s. Before the reforms of 
Alexander II the local nobility had adequate forms of local organization, but rarely 
concerned themselves with national issues.16 Part of this opposition to the central 
authorities was a result of frictions caused by the zemstvos’ ill-defined relationship with 
the autocracy and administrative structure. The zemstvos existed outside of the state 
administration, as they had no central representation and inter-zemstvo cooperation was 
prohibited.17 Petrov has argued that while decreasing the reach of the zemstvo, such 
truncated autonomous democratic self-government was incompatible with the 
autocracy, so by their very nature the zemstvos became a hotbed for constitutional 
political thought.18 Tensions arising from this conceptual incompatibility between 
autocracy and local self-government were exacerbated by expectations created when the 
zemstvos were instituted that they represented part of a process towards a representative 
parliament.19 Therefore, from their inception in 1864, the zemstvos’ relationship with 
the autocracy was ill-defined, leading to frictions between the two. That the autocracy 
was aware of this contradiction is further supported by the zemstvo system not being 
extended to Poland and the western provinces; the tsarist government was of the opinion 
that granting any local autonomy in these regions would intensify already prevalent 
unrest in these regions.20 
                                                     
14 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 39. 
15 Charles Timberlake, ‘The Zemstvo and the Development of a Russian Middle Class’, in Edith Clowes, 
Samuel Kassow, and James West (eds.), Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for 
Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 178. 
16 Geoffrey Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 2.   
17 McKenzie, ‘The Zemstvo and the Administration’, 48. 
18 Feodor Petrov, ‘Crowning the Edifice: The Zemstvo, Local Self-Government, and the Constitutional 
Movement, 1864-1881’, trans. R. Bisha, in B. Eklof, J. Bushnell and L. Zakharova (eds.), Russia’s Great 
Reforms, 1855-1881 (Bloomington: Indiana University press, 1994), 202.  
19 George Fischer, Russian Liberalism: From gentry to Intelligentsia, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), 11. 
20 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the 
Western Frontier, 1863-1914, (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 137. 
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Due to their unique relationship with the autocracy the zemstvos became centers of 
opposition to the regime. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, constitutional 
political ideas in gentry associations became less abstract and more applicable to the 
political environment of Russia.21 In the aftermath of emancipation, several noble 
assemblies expressed discontent with the terms of the emancipation, the more liberal 
ones such as Tver proposing an abolition of class distinctions.22 These demands were 
gradually translated into political demands for an elected assembly to complete peasant 
reform, and promulgate other necessary reforms.23 However, due to prohibitions on the 
discussion of political subjects in the zemstvos, serious opposition to the regime among 
the zemstvos did not occur until the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war and the 
resulting creation of a constitutionalist regime in Bulgaria.24 An illegal conference of 
zemstvo officials was held in Moscow in 1879, and prominent members of the 
movement attempted to make links with the radical left before the assassination of 
Alexander II alienated the monarchist rank and file.  
 
Subsequent agricultural downturns and peasant unrest in the 1890s had the effect of 
pushing the majority of the zemstvos back into opposition to the regime. The 
government’s failure to provide adequate relief for the famine of 1891 had the effect of 
prompting private famine relief which strengthened rural involvement in voluntary 
associations such as the zemstvos.25 Nicholas II’s speech upon his ascension, which 
described the demands of the zemstvos as senseless dreams, has been linked to 
prominent members of the zemstvos seeking inter zemstvo contacts on a national 
level.26 
  
This oppositional activity was sustained and crystalized into a definitive movement at 
the turn of the century. A small minority of the zemstvo leadership became politically 
active in the underground Beseda group, which published the liberal journal Liberation. 
This publication represented the first movement outside of the zemstvo system to seek 
                                                     
21 Gary Hamburg, The Politics of the Russian Nobility 1881-1905 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1984), 55. 
22 Terrence Emmons, The Russian Landed Gentry and the Emancipation of 1861, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968), 360-61. 
23 Emmons, The Russian Landed Gentry and the Emancipation of 1861, 347-48. 
24 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 46; Petrov, ‘Crowning the Edifice’, 203. 
25 Joseph Bradley, ‘Voluntary Associations, Civic Culture, and Obshchestvenost in Moscow’, in Edith 
Clowes, Samuel Kassow, and James West (eds.), Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the 
Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 141. 
26 Terrence Emmons, ‘The Beseda Circle, 1899-1905’, Slavic Review vol. 32, no. 3 (1974), 464. 
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realization of general constitutionalist goals, but contained very little detail in order to 
appeal to both the radical left and the more moderate zemstvo gentry.27 More general 
political activity within the zemstvos came as a result of the reverses of the Russo-
Japanese war and the death of the Minister of the Interior, V. K. Plehve, and subsequent 
appointment of Prince Mirsky to the Ministry of the Interior, who was seen as favoring 
liberal reforms.28 This manifested itself in the November 1904 zemstvo congress, 
organized by the leaders of the liberation movement, which passed resolutions critical 
of the bureaucratic order.29 This was followed by an extensive banquet campaign in the 
provinces, which had the effect of mobilizing large sections of the provincial gentry in 
opposition to the tsarist regime. These banquets passed significantly oppositional 
resolutions, and historians have argued that the left in this period were so well organized 
that they effectively stole the leadership of zemstvo opposition from the right.30 
According to Freeze, this was especially significant as it occurred at a time when 
liberalism amongst the intelligentsia shifted significantly to the left.31   
 
At the beginning of the period that will be the subject of this study, Bloody Sunday and 
the February Ukase served to sufficiently mobilize the zemstvo rank and file so as to 
initiate a series of large congresses. The congresses of 1905 were attended by delegates 
from the provincial zemstvos. The first congress, held in May, passed resolutions 
calling for a constitutional system of government, the abolition of temporary emergency 
regulations, and widespread civil rights to all Russian subjects. Subsequent congresses 
were held in July, September, and November, and were primarily concerned with tactics 
and drafting responses to government concessions such as the proposals for the Bulygin 
Duma and the October Manifesto. During this period splits between the liberal Zemstvo 
Constitutionalist group, later the Kadet party, and the more moderate group led by 
Shipov became apparent due to the divergence of their political programs.32  
 
The subsequent formation of political parties and era of parliamentary politics 
effectively brought liberal opposition to the regime outside of the institution of the 
zemstvos. From the winter of 1905-1906, the zemstvos became a locus of moderate and 
                                                     
27 Emmons, ‘The Beseda Circle’, 462. 
28 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 68. 
29 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 70. 
30 Becker, Nobility and Privilege, 157.   
31 Gregory Freeze, ‘A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901-1903’, 
Slavic Review vol. 28, no. 1 (1969), 82. 
32 Gerald Surh, 1905 in St Petersburg: Labor, Society, and Revolution, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1989), 254. 
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conservative activity, as new parties of law and order arose in many localities to oppose 
the Kadets in the Duma and zemstvo elections.33 Upon the dissolution of the second 
Duma a subsequent zemstvo congress was held, which supported the government’s 
restriction of the electoral franchise. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the zemstvos 
did not become apathetic to politics. Their repudiation of their former representatives in 
early 1906, then in the Kadet and Octobrist parties, suggests a level of political 
discourse still existed in the zemstvos, and that instead of being apathetic the zemstvo 
rank and file were politically opposed to the Kadet and Octobrist parties. This is 
supported by evidence that reactionary gentry organizations, such as the United 
Nobility, actively participated in politics, which played a key role in lobbying the tsarist 
government to the detriment of the second Duma.34  
 
 
Current Historiography 
 
The historiographical debate surrounding the reasons for increased tensions between the 
zemstvos and the autocracy centers on the question as to whether the landed gentry that 
sat on the zemstvos were motivated by class or estate interest. The lack of a common 
identity among the members of the landed nobility has been cited as evidence that 
zemstvo demands must represent the operation of interest politics, and that the zemstvo 
movement represented an upper class movement against the economic policies of the 
Russian Finance Minister from 1892-1903, Sergei Witte, and the Finance Ministry.35 
Becker’s analysis of the landed gentry in the period suggests that tensions would have 
already been high between the landed gentry and the bureaucracy due to socio-
economic differences between the two groups and the process by which landed gentry 
were slowly forced out of central bureaucratic offices and turned to the zemstvos as a 
replacement for their lost service careers.36 However, the argument that the landed 
gentry opposed the central government due to class interest is complicated by the fact 
that the landed nobility owed their special status in Russian society to the state. 
 
                                                     
33 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 196. 
34 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 229. 
35 Thomas Fallows, ‘The Zemstvo and the Bureaucracy, 1890-1904’ in T. Emmons and W. Vucinich 
(eds.), The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 215; for a summary of the ‘fronde’ argument advanced especially by Soviet 
historians, Hamburg, The Politics of the Russian Nobility, 68. 
36 Becker, Nobility and Privilege, 156. 
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Other historians have suggested that the split between the central government in St 
Petersburg and the provincial zemstvos had more to do with an increasing amount of 
central bureaucratic interference with the working of the zemstvos. Fallows has 
highlighted an increase in competition between the zemstvos and the Finance Ministry 
for tax revenue and the police effort to root out radical influences in the zemstvos as 
significant factors that pushed many members of the zemstvos into the ranks of the 
opposition prior to 1905.37 As early as the 1860s the zemstvos, in the demands that they 
put forward to the state for representation, had shown a concern for liberal principles 
linked to the extension of self-government. The scope and social value of the programs 
carried out by the early zemstvos more than fulfilled the early advocates of self-rule,38 
and gentry memoir materiel became permeated with desires for a more independent and 
autonomous social role throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century.39 Therefore, 
zemstvo opposition could also have been based on the desire to have a more 
autonomous role from St Petersburg, and freedom to implement their philanthropic 
projects in education and agronomy, rather than the narrow class interests of what 
remained of the landed gentry by 1905. 
 
While it is clear that there had emerged a split between the nobility of the central 
bureaucracy and the nobility that was still attached to the land and resented bureaucratic 
interference into the zemstvos, the extent to which this affected the political expression 
of the zemstvos during the revolution of 1905 and the first two Dumas has been widely 
debated. Manning’s shift to the right thesis suggested that the landed gentry repudiated 
the Kadet and Octobrist leadership during the winter of 1905-1906 due to fears that the 
new electoral system would result in the loss of their dominant position in the 
countryside and the threat of the policy of land expropriation that was adopted by the 
Kadet party.40 This point of reasoning has also been advanced by Haimson, who argued 
that due to the land policy that was adopted by the Kadet party the identities of the 
liberals and the landed gentry became completely incompatible, given the importance of 
land to the identity of the latter group.41 Hosking’s view of the shift to the right, 
however, suggested a more moderate shift, with zemstvo assemblies generally 
                                                     
37 Fallows, ‘The Zemstvo and the Bureaucracy’, 217. 
38 Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-70 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), 301. 
39 Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 39. 
40 Manning, The Crisis of The Old Order, 180. 
41 Hamburg, The Politics of the Russian Nobility, 223. 
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supporting the October Manifesto as a sound basis for a constitutional system but 
rejecting further reform.42 
 
The shift to the right thesis has been supported by studies of various provincial 
zemstvos that found a greater level of organization of right wing factions from 1906.43 
Recent research has also illustrated how the liberal ideals of the Russian intelligentsia 
were seen as alien to the concept of Russian nationhood by conservatives in Russia,44 
further supporting the contention that the zemstvo rank and file and liberalism were 
incompatible, and that zemstvo politics was an expression of class interest. 
 
Liberal demands originating from the zemstvos before 1905 made no mention of land 
expropriation or of universal suffrage; it therefore may not follow that liberal or 
constitutional thought among the zemstvos was dependent upon these concepts. While it 
is clear that the members of the Union of Liberation supported such concepts, they were 
forced in early zemstvos meetings and the publication of Liberation to construct 
proposals that did not contain concrete details in order to garner wide political support, 
such as the simple assertion of the removal of the autocracy.45 The early zemstvos that 
campaigned for constitutionalism also did not demand the institution of a wide basis for 
democracy. Therefore, it could be argued that the shift to the right did not represent a 
complete rejection of liberalism, rather a rejection of the Kadet brand of liberalism that 
included principles such as land expropriation and the immediate implementation of 
universal suffrage. That the Kadets and Octobrists espoused such principles in the 
Duma may in part have been due to the system of politics in the Duma. Often Kadet 
members of the Duma had relied upon large peasant votes in the second stage of the 
election,46 which had a part to play in Kadet support for land expropriation and the 
immediate implementation of universal suffrage.  
 
Political demands which could be referred to as liberal, but which did not go as far as 
the Kadets, had been made by the zemstvos since their creation in 1864. These were 
mainly focused upon their role as public bodies, and proposed greater control or 
                                                     
42 Hosking, The Russian Constitutional Experiment, 29 
43 Don Rawson, ‘Rightist Politics in the Revolution of 1905: The Case of Tula Province’, Slavic Review, 
vol. 51, no. 1 (1992). 
44 Nathaniel Knight, ‘Was the Intelligentsia Part of the Nation? Visions of Society in Post-Emancipation 
Russia’, Kritika vol. 7, no. 4 (2006) 752. 
45 Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on the left 1870-1905 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1980), 316; Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties, 28. 
46 Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties, 371.  
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influence over the lives of Russians in order to promote notions of individualism, self-
reliance, and awareness of one’s rights and obligations as a citizen. The Tver nobility in 
1862, whilst calling for the implementation of representation for all sections of society 
in order to solve the crisis in provincial administration, recognized that participation in 
political life could transform provincial life into a modern civil society whereby all 
citizens took a share of responsibility.47 When wider participation in public affairs was 
effectively curtailed by the government by Alexander III’s counter reforms, many 
zemstvo activists were happy to occupy themselves with small social projects such as 
agronomy and improvements to education to fulfill similar goals.48 This can be equated 
with the activity of professional associations that presented typical nineteenth century 
themes such as self-reliance, individual initiative, and such activity that aimed to 
produce better citizens.49 
 
The concepts of self-reliance and the formation of civil society are very similar to 
liberal theories about the role that civil society played in tsarist Russia. Both Peter 
Struve and Paul Miliukov, leaders of the liberal movement in Russia just before the 
outbreak of the 1905 revolution, believed that the development of morality in society, 
necessary for the formation of civil society, was the safeguarding of the human 
individual being able to act in freedom. Struve, in his essay ‘What is True 
Nationalism?’ argued that for the attainment of the morally proper among the citizenry, 
the interests of the individual should not be sacrificed to the needs of the state.50 
Similarly, Miliukov held that the lack of self-assertion in Russia lay behind the lack of 
the social spirit which lay at the heart of the notion of property, law, and ethical 
sanction. Paramount to this was the safeguarding of civil and political rights of the 
individual, and the fulfillment of economic independence, which would result in 
understanding and respect for the rights of themselves and others. Therefore, for 
Miliukov, the role of the Duma was, ‘to sow constitutional seeds among the Russian 
people to alter their behaviors and attitudes towards public life’, which he argued had 
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been hindered by the state through restrictions that it had placed upon political 
expression.51  
 
The similarity between zemstvo activity and liberal theory before 1905 supports the 
case that liberal and constitutional thought among the zemstvos should not be entirely 
equated with their support for the Kadet party and their policies of land expropriation 
and the immediate implementation of universal suffrage. Russian constitutional thought 
among the zemstvos can be studied by investigating the extent to which the political 
demands made, and opinions expressed, by the zemstvos during the revolution of 1905-
1907 can be linked to liberal principles of the importance of individual freedom and the 
recognition of mutual rights and responsibilities in a constitutional society. This 
analysis will be able to enhance our understanding of the rejection of the main liberal 
parities by the zemstvos during the first two Dumas.  
 
The importance that the zemstvos attached to the concept of individual freedom and 
expression can be investigated through analysis of discreet, but somewhat overlapping 
areas of the political expression of the zemstvos. Firstly, the issue of land expropriation 
will be discussed. Generally opposed by the zemstvo rank and file, this was probably 
the most emotive topic for them, and can be linked to wider political discourses about 
the nature of peasant farming. In particular, this will improve our understanding of the 
importance that was attached by this group to economic freedom and the importance of 
the individual producer in Russian agriculture, and the lack of individualism the was 
thought to be present among the peasantry.52 
 
Secondly, the attitude of the provincial members of the zemstvos towards the wider 
participation of the population in politics will be analyzed. This will be a question of to 
what extent a more restrictive assembly was envisaged to safeguard gentry interests, or 
to act as a process of political modernization on the rest of the population. This will 
address questions such as the perceived role of the Duma, as well as the political 
maturity of the rest of the population, and can be linked to similar ideas about the 
individual citizen in Russia and the development of civil society as will be discussed in 
the analysis of land expropriation. 
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Thirdly, the attitudes expressed by the zemstvo rank and file towards the 
implementation of civil rights, and the importance of these in a constitutional regime, 
will be considered. The reactions of the zemstvo rank and file to the widespread 
violation of civil rights as a result of government repression in the wake of peasant 
disturbances will be studied in order to address this research area. This will be related to 
how the zemstvo rank and file perceived the role of the rule of law, and the importance 
of the government adhering to such legally defined standards, in the formation of a civil 
society. 
 
In a wider historiographical framework, this research seeks to improve our historical 
understanding of the relationship between the zemstvos and the implementation of 
constitutional reform in Russia, which will have ramifications for our understanding of 
the stability of Russian society on the eve of World War I. According to pessimistic 
interpretations of the political and social history of pre-revolutionary Russia, social and 
political instability in Russia meant that the fall of the tsarist regime was inevitable. 
This was particularly exacerbated by the polarisation between the upper and lower strata 
of Russia’s urban circles, and the inability of the government to cooperate with political 
groups due to the ambiguities about the extent of power that the constitution accorded 
the government and the legislative chamber.53  
 
More recent developments to this thesis have argued that the gulf between the regime 
and society was clear in day-to-day repressive policy, and was compounded by 
economic and social change to which the regime had no adequate response.54 Further 
research has suggested that the regime’s social base was in the process of becoming 
eroded, and that the middle classes were small and had fractured aims at best.55 The 
precedent for this was set by the coup d’état of 3 June 1907, whereby the government 
effectively narrowed the base of political participation to the moderate and right parties, 
propertied classes and the officialdom. This has been credited with creating an 
extremely fragile base upon which the regime attempted to support itself.56 
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Alternatively, a recent study of Russian society on the eve of the First World War 
highlighted the various ways in which Russian society was able to cooperate with the 
government in order to promote social stability, suggesting a more positive view of 
Russian development had the First World War not happened.57  
 
The members of the zemstvos in the provinces who tended to be engaged in agricultural 
pursuits have been identified as one of these reactionary groupings who opposed 
constitutional reform, due to the shift to the right that occurred in the winter of 1905-
1906.58  Therefore, this research will be able to offer significant conclusions about the 
attitudes of this group, closely connected to the government in the period between 1906-
1914, towards liberal reform and the cooperation of government and society. 
 
 
A Note on the Sources 
 
A collection of sources that can be used to study political opinion in the zemstvos, 
although less systematic than official zemstvo records, is the political intelligence 
gathering undertaken by British diplomatic staff in Russia. Britain would have held a 
special interest in gathering information regarding political developments in Russia. The 
British Foreign Secretaries in the period, Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey, 
favored an Anglo-Russian understanding to achieve a favorable balance of power in 
Europe,59 which was complicated by the fact that the British and Russian colonial 
governments in Asia still viewed each other as threats.60 Therefore, political 
developments in Russia had added implications for the British Empire in areas such as 
China, India, and Persia. These factors would have made British diplomatic staff 
particularly keen observers of political developments.  
 
Britain also possessed a large amount of investment in Russia during the period. 
Although in comparison to French capital it made up a smaller proportion of foreign 
capital in Russia, due to complex French tax laws that favored investment in joint-stock 
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companies, British investment tended to be more direct resulting in more British 
operated firms in Russia as a proportion to capital invested.61 British capital was also 
proportionally less invested in government bonds and railroad stocks.62 Although the 
Russian economy had begun to diversify, agriculture in 1905-7 still accounted for the 
income of the vast majority of the population. As a result, the yearly fluctuations of 
agricultural yields affected the vitality of other sectors, through its effect on the 
purchasing power of the Russian consumer and the frequency and volume of 
government orders based on the income from the export of grain.63 Analysis of this 
sector, in terms of its stability and economic vitality, would have been of importance to 
British interests in Russia, and it will be demonstrated below that one of the main 
sources of information about the Russian countryside for British officials were elected 
officials on zemstvo boards. 
 
Historians critical of the diplomatic corps before First World War have asserted that 
reports produced by this group were jaundiced by their typically elite socio-economic 
status of members of the Edwardian establishment.64 However, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century diplomats became more specialized, and moved between the 
diplomatic and parliamentary services less often.65 Monitoring the political opposition 
and collecting sensitive political materiel became an increasingly important role for 
diplomatic staff in the period,66 with the result that diplomatic reports are arguably more 
reflective of Russian political opinions than has previously been suggested. Further, it 
can be demonstrated that the provincial membership of the zemstvos played an 
important role in the formulation of political intelligence. 
 
Although the Foreign Office was becoming more professional, in the diplomatic corps 
there were still significant numbers of wealthy aristocrats and landowners.67 Although 
this would have created a certain political coloration of their reports, it did mean that the 
authors of British political intelligence gathering were likely to share the world view of 
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the landed gentry involved with the zemstvos. That these sources are likely to reflect 
political opinion among the landed gentry can be demonstrated by the political beliefs 
of some of the diplomats. The majority of British diplomatic staff felt that Russia 
should embrace moderate political change, a reflection of the prevailing attitude in 
Britain at the time that regarded the liberal opposition to the regime in Russia as 
legitimate due to the repressive caprices of the regime.68 This increases their usefulness 
for investigating the political opinions that embraced moderate political change. That 
the diplomats would have been able to get access to these social circles is supported by 
the experience of the American ambassador, George Meyer, whose background allowed 
him to mingle with the aristocracy in St Petersburg.69 
  
Consular records also indicate that a good local standing was a significant prerequisite 
to appointment as a consular officer in the provinces of Russia. That this was the case 
can be borne out in some examples of consular activity where consular officials seem to 
have gone above and beyond the call of duty in pandering to the interests of the local 
nobility. For example, the consular officials in Odessa seem to have spent an inordinate 
amount of time in 1906 attempting to get the marriage of a British man to the daughter 
of a local noble family recognized in Russia.70 Consul Charles Smith’s assessments of 
the various candidates in the laborious process of appointing a replacement vice-consul 
in Theodosia in mid-1907, while he was acting as British consul to Odessa, are 
particularly illuminative of this. In the case of M. Carassarini, Smith wrote to the British 
ambassador, Arthur Nicolson, that ‘Nothing definite has been alleged to his discredit, 
but on the whole my conclusion was that his standing was hardly as well established as 
is desirable for a vice-consul.’71 Another candidate, the current vice-consul at Warsaw 
was turned down on the basis that ‘If appointed, he proposes to set up business at 
Theodosia, but he has no private means and is not well established there... I fear he may 
be unsuitable.’72 Both sections of the British diplomatic service in Russia, the 
diplomatic corps and the consular staff, had similar social standing to the zemstvo rank 
and file and as a result could be reasonably expected to have reflected the world view of 
the zemstvo rank and file.  
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The activities of Bosanquet, a major contributor to British political intelligence 
gathering in the period while he was the vice-consul at Odessa, indicates that in the 
provinces it is likely that British officials would have naturally sought out members of 
the landed gentry for information on various developments as opposed to other social 
groups. Bosanquet explicitly stated that in his extensive agrarian reports in 1905 and 
1906, members of the zemstvos and provincial landed gentry made up the vast majority 
of his sources, especially in 1906 when he found the countryside largely inaccessible 
and so was forced to confine his research to provincial towns.73 This supports the 
likelihood that consular reports usually reflect the opinions of the local landed gentry. 
 
British political intelligence gathering cannot be expected to have been as 
geographically systematic as an analysis of zemstvo records could be, but the 
geographical coverage of British political intelligence gathering in Russia was still 
considerable. There was a significant consular network covering Russia servicing 
British interests in the provinces, therefore British political intelligence gathering 
possessed a reasonable coverage of political opinion in the provinces. The British 
ambassador to Russia at the beginning of the period, Charles Hardinge, took an active 
interest in local affairs and encouraged consular staff to submit reports of political 
activity in the provinces.74 It is reasonable to assume that this trend would have been 
continued until at least 1907 under Hardinge’s successor, Nicolson. That these consular 
reports would have been an accurate reflection of political attitudes in the provinces is 
supported by the career patterns of the consular staff that spent most of their time 
dealing with their own business interests in Russia.75 Combined with the tendency of 
diplomatic staff to reflect the opinions of the landed gentry, political intelligence 
gathering among the landed gentry in Russia is likely to have been particularly 
effective. 
 
Wider diplomatic pressures and the precarious relationship between Britain and Russia 
would have created a tendency for British political intelligence gathering to have been 
concerned with the moderate opposition as opposed to the radicals. It is unlikely that 
British diplomatic staff would have had much contact with the members of the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalist movement because of Russian suspicions of British motives, due to 
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Britain’s alliance with Japan during the Russo-Japanese war, which meant that the 
tsarist government would have viewed British connections with radical groups as 
suspicious.76 Connection between the leaders of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists and the 
extreme left meant that it is likely that the former would have featured less in British 
political reports. Organizations such as the Union of Liberation would have been 
clandestine until the promulgation of the October Manifesto, which promised the 
freedom of association.77 The refusal of the Kadet party to repudiate revolutionary 
violence in the Duma period would have caused further problems for British officials to 
accurately document their political opinions. As a result, British information from the 
zemstvo would have been more likely to originate from the provincial landed sections 
of the zemstvo movement, rather than the professional urban sections. 
 
There are some limitations to the use of British political intelligence gathering. Due to 
intense time and financial pressures placed upon British diplomatic staff in the period it 
is unlikely that their reports can be a complete survey of zemstvo opinion. The lower 
ranks of officials at the British embassy were also notoriously underpaid, and had a 
large amount of other tasks to complete as well as political intelligence gathering. 
Consuls found themselves in a similar position; they were usually part time which 
would have affected the completeness of their political intelligence gathering, and had 
to complete many different tasks that often left them little time to deal with state 
duties.78 The records of the consular offices in Russia during this time period are littered 
with requests for more money from the Foreign Office to pay for clerical support. For 
example, in April 1907, W. Thesiger, the British consul in St Petersburg, applied to the 
Foreign Office to have his subordinate, a Mr. Mackie, promoted the status of vice-
consul in order to increase Mackie’s pay in light of the latter’s escalating clerical 
costs.79 Consul Montgomery Grove at Moscow made a similar request for more funds to 
pay for clerical assistance in his consular area in March of the same year.80 Consular 
staff had many demands of their time and money; therefore their reports cannot be taken 
as a complete picture of zemstvo opinion in their districts. 
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The last point underscores the fact that the records would have received certain 
coloration from the individuals who produced them. While some officials may have had 
a strong background in Russian affairs, others may not have had much knowledge of the 
Russian political scene, or allowed their reports to reflect their political opinions. For 
example, Hardinge possessed previous experience of working in Russia.81 He was also 
an advocate of an Anglo-Russian alliance in order to maintain the balance of power in 
Europe, but recognized that this would be politically impossible if the government of 
Russia remained reactionary.82 Absences by Hardinge meant that for the latter half of 
1905 the British charge d’affaires, Cecil Spring Rice, produced the majority of 
diplomatic reports. In contrast to Hardinge, Spring Rice had little experience of Russian 
language and culture,83 and possessed a pessimistic view of the conditions in Russia and 
the likelihood of the success of liberal reform.84 Therefore, in comparison to Hardinge, 
his pessimism may have resulted in him devaluing the importance of the liberal 
movement in Russia. Nicolson replaced Hardinge in May 1906. Like Hardinge, he was 
in favor of an Anglo-Russian understanding.85 Forming his opinions of Russia during 
the upheavals of the revolution, he believed that Russia needed to be governed firmly, 
and put his faith in gradual reform put forward by Peter Stolypin, the Russian Prime 
Minister from 1906.86  
 
It is also significant that diplomatic reports often contain prejudices and beliefs that 
those producing the dispatches sometimes accepted without qualification. For example, 
both Hardinge and Spring Rice repeated the official viewpoint of Jewish involvement in 
the unrest of 1905 with little or no reservations,87 so presumably they shared this anti-
Semitism. Diplomatic reports are therefore limited in terms of the political knowledge 
of their authors, and this varied from individual to individual. 
 
Sources that are similar to the British diplomatic reports in terms of presenting a broad 
view of liberal opinion are retrospective migrant literature and literature produced about 
Russia by British travelers, newspaper correspondents, and academics, such as Bernard 
Pares and Maurice Baring. They are representative of the movement of British and 
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emigrant Russians writing about Russia from around 1900 in order to inform British 
opinion on Russian matters.88 One such example is Donald Mackenzie Wallace, who 
was given a royal commission to report to Nicolson and the king on the nature of 
Russian political developments through his contacts within the Russian government.89 
 
However, unlike the diplomatic reports, this type of literature was written to mold 
public opinion in Britain. For example, Pares aimed to create an understanding of 
Russia in order to make another Anglo-Russian war impossible and to use British 
influence to create a more liberal Russia.90 On the other hand, Wallace was particularly 
dismissive of the Kadet party’s ability to come to a political compromise in the first 
Duma, and attempted to influence British views of Russia which he believed were too 
complimentary to the Russian left.91  However, the strength of these documents is that 
they were generally written by experts on Russian political conditions at the turn of the 
century, so it can be assumed that their experience of Russian politics can fill the gaps 
left by British officials such as Spring Rice who lacked experience. These individuals 
also served as correspondents for British newspapers, so often these sources are based 
on the reporting of individuals with a good knowledge of Russian affairs.  
 
Russian refugees writing at the beginning of the century and in the 1920s would also 
have been writing for a similar purpose. Research into Russian emigrant communities 
has shown that even in exile they strongly identified with Russia,92 so it is feasible that 
such writers would have been attempting to influence events in Russia, or Western 
opinion of Russia. However, they are useful because many writers were heavily 
involved in the zemstvo movement, and can offer perspectives on liberal opinion 
amongst the zemstvos that would not necessarily have featured in zemstvo records or 
British political intelligence gathering. In a similar manner to British travelers and 
commentators on Russian affairs, these individuals would have had inside knowledge of 
various Russian movements such as the Zemstvo Constitutionalists, which can give a 
fresh perspective on the activities of the zemstvo rank and file.  
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To sum up, Diplomatic reports represent a useful alternative record of the political 
opinions of the zemstvo rank and file. They were produced with the aim of creating an 
accurate survey of Russian political opinions. Their information gathering would have 
been restricted to the more moderate sections of Russian political opinion, as opposed to 
the far left or reactionary parties. This would have to an extent excluded the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalists, until they achieved a more legitimate status in the form of the Kadet 
and Octobrist parties, due to the political beliefs of the diplomats and practical 
constraints placed upon engaging with the opposition in Russia. As a result, these 
records are more likely to reflect the opinions of the more moderate zemstvo rank and 
file. Their intelligence gathering activities were not restricted to the urban centers, but 
made use of the extensive consular network in Russia. While they cannot match official 
zemstvo records in terms of how geographically representative they were, they were not 
so completely urban-centric to be unrepresentative of zemstvo opinion. However, it 
should be remembered that their content was only as informative as the author’s 
knowledge of Russian affairs. The writings of British travelers and Russian political 
refugees, while being treated with more care due to their underlying aims, can be used 
to supplement the overall picture provided by British diplomatic intelligence gathering, 
as they often possessed a more detailed knowledge of the Russian political environment. 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CRISIS OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND THE ZEMSTVO 
ALTERNATIVE TO LAND EXPROPRIATION 
 
 
This chapter will address political opinions among the zemstvo rank and file on the 
subject of the agricultural crisis and land expropriation, with a view to exploring the 
value that was attached to the power of the individual economic effort amongst the 
peasantry. The resolution of the agricultural crisis was one of the main political 
battlegrounds in the first two Dumas. Although Russia’s agricultural output increased in 
line with population, output had been negatively affected by severe harvest failures in 
1891, 1897, 1901 and 1906.1 In the revolutionary period, the decision taken by the 
government in 1905 to cancel the peasants’ redemption payments was ill-timed, as it 
coincided with a significant collapse in the visibility of government power in the 
countryside and a time of extreme peasant hardship.2 The revolutionary period was 
punctuated with extreme periods of peasant unrest, beginning in the summer of 1905 
and peaking in the winter of 1905-6, which resulted in substantial losses to lands held 
by the noble landowners represented on the zemstvo boards. For the zemstvo rank and 
file at the beginning of 1905, memories of the 1902 peasant uprisings in the provinces 
of Poltava and Kharkov would still have been fresh. As a result, the condition of the 
peasantry and the solution of the agricultural crisis would have been incredibly 
important issues for this group. 
 
This chapter will investigate whether the opinions of the zemstvo rank and file can be 
conveniently pigeonholed into the camp of the reactionary opponents of land 
expropriation, or whether they developed a more complex attitude towards agrarian 
reform based upon their experiences of peasant agriculture. This will be observable 
through an analysis of the prevalence of explanations involving the economic concept 
of the power of the individual producer in reasons put forward by the zemstvo rank and 
file for the perceived crisis in peasant agriculture.  It will then be considered to what 
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extent the peasants were seen to be motivated by the prospect of obtaining more land 
from the landowners in their dealings with the Duma, and how this can reinforce the 
view that the zemstvo rank and file regarded the development of the concept of the 
individual amongst the peasantry as defective. Finally, zemstvo proposals for reform 
will be considered, not only on the basis of how they represented a separate vision for 
rural Russia from the Kadet strategy of expropriation and the reactionary program of 
minimal intervention, but on the basis of how they aimed to foster a sense of 
individualism within the peasantry through measures related to the perceived problems 
in the countryside. 
 
 
Individual Economic Effort and the ‘Crisis’ in Peasant Agriculture 
 
For the zemstvo rank and file the crisis in peasant agriculture was in part a crisis of 
innovation, and agricultural innovation was intimately linked to the importance of 
individual effort in the countryside. To explore this further, it will be necessary firstly to 
further define the principle of economic individual effort in the context of contemporary 
debates about Russian agriculture. This chapter will then assess zemstvo opinions about 
how the structures of the Russian countryside impeded the realisation of individual 
economic effort by analysing zemstvo opinions on the state of peasant capital and their 
access to capital through credit. It will then consider how this was deemed to impact 
upon peasant methods of farming in order to assess the similarities between zemstvo 
opinion and liberal discourses on the power of the individual producer in the period. 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Russian educated society’s attitude to Russian 
agricultural life had fundamentally changed. The popularity of the Slavophile belief in 
the inherent superiority of the traditional communal Russian way of rural life was 
decreasing, and educated observers of Russian provincial life began to look to Western 
Europe for models of economic modernisation, and became fundamentally hostile to the 
systems of Russian village life.3  On-going evolution in educated opinion on agrarian 
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matters, which began long before dedicated empirical studies on the subject were 
conducted, resulted in the majority of educated Russians believing that private 
economic effort was superior to communal economic effort.4 This was reflected in Peter 
Stolypin’s policy as Prime Minister in 1906. According to Ascher, ‘Stolypin’s signal 
achievement was to translate the abstract ideas on agrarian reform into reality.’5 
Therefore, Russian contemporary thought held that the longevity of communal 
economic organisation in the countryside hindered the development of individualistic 
farming among the majority of the Russian peasantry. That this expectation was present 
in zemstvo circles is supported by research by Darrow, who found that the manner in 
which zemstvo agricultural studies measured agricultural productivity did not presume 
that the peasant would be farming primarily for profit, on the basis of the maximum 
potential of the land, and affected heavily by market forces.6 
 
Russian liberal thought before 1905 agreed with the contemporary trend about the 
viability of the independent economic producer, and connected the absence of 
individual effort with the immaturity of civil society in Russia. The peasants lacked the 
economic independence required to engage in independent productive activity, which 
led to them having a poor understanding of the reciprocal rights and obligations that 
belong to the citizens of a constitutional regime.7 A more detailed exposition of this 
concept can be found in the works of Paul Miliukov, an important liberal leader during 
the period who was heavily involved in the Kadet party. In an American lecture 
Miliukov stated that the difference between the United States and Russia was that 
Russia’s abundance of natural resources had been used as a substitute for energy and 
individual effort, leading to their exhaustion.8 He connected such mode of positive 
action with a lack of a, ‘body of social tradition, which determines social conduct and 
works out formulas which act as stimulus of coercion’.9 Individual economic effort was 
therefore a cornerstone of the formation of a constitutional society based upon defined 
norms of interaction between its citizens. 
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This concern is detectable in the aims of Stolypin’s agrarian reform of November 1906. 
This reform enabled peasants to leave the commune with their share of communal lands 
in a consolidated plot.10 Ascher has argued that by allowing the peasants to abandon the 
commune and farm individually, the reform was crafted to produce a fundamental 
change in the peasant’s mentality. It aimed to inculcate within the peasantry the 
concepts of citizenship and civil obligation, and addressed the lack of respect of law and 
order that represented the bedrock of a state based upon law.11 This was predominantly 
to be achieved through the agency of the concept of private property, which the 
government saw as necessary for the development of the establishment of order in the 
countryside.12 This contention is supported by criticisms of the commune from among 
educated sections of Russian society that accuse it of engendering moral defectiveness, 
apathy, and a lack of incentive among the peasantry.13 For this reason, the economic 
independence of individual peasant producers was important in the conceptualisation of 
a constitutional regime. The role of this concept in how the zemstvo rank and file 
conceptualised the problems of Russian peasant agriculture will therefore be able to 
inform our understanding of to what extent the zemstvo rank and file identified with 
liberal narratives about the importance of individual economic freedom in a 
constitutional regime.  
 
In such an analysis, it is important to consider that Russian peasant agriculture was very 
rarely orientated around commercial farming, whether it was in a communal setting or 
on private land. A. V. Chayanov, a Soviet agrarian economist, in a study of the peasant 
economy, stressed that peasant families’ volume of production was dictated by the 
worker to consumer ration of the family. Therefore, peasant families had a cycle of 
prosperity that was dependent upon the number of children above or below working 
age, the number of older dependents, the number of daughters-in-law present in the 
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household, and sons leaving the family to start their own families.14 This importance of 
working family members meant that it was incorrect to apply capitalistic models to the 
peasant economy because the peasantry did not use hired labour, which means they had 
no valid way to judge the value of their work. As a result, peasant families could not 
make objective judgements on how much product to save for the family, and how much 
to reinvest in improving their land or agricultural machinery, in the same way in which 
a capitalistic enterprise was able to do so.15  
 
Chayanov also claimed that peasant families struck a rough balance between satisfying 
their basic needs and the drudgery of the work, which he called their self-exploitation.16 
Chayanov argued that as a result, peasant family run farms behaved very differently to 
capitalistic ones to changes in the economic environment. For example, they did not 
take interest rates into account when investing in agricultural machinery.17 This 
highlights how educated opinion utilised foreign economic models that were not 
necessarily accurate to the Russian experience in order to make political points, which 
underlines the significance of the concept of the primacy of individual economic effort 
in linking agriculture to political debates about the formation of a constitutional society. 
That the zemstvo rank and file shared the view that individual economic effort was 
connected to the emergence of civil society can be examined through an analysis of 
zemstvo opinion on the causes of peasant poverty and lack of access to credit. 
 
National concern over peasant poverty was triggered by the agrarian disaster of 1891, 
and was further compounded by the later agricultural downturns and Poltava and 
Kharkov uprisings.18 Contemporary educated Russian opinion held that peasant poverty 
was due to a combination of accelerated population growth and the action of powerful 
levelling forces within the Russian countryside, and the division of peasant society into 
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two classes, based upon the 1896 census data and the penetration of the market and 
wage-labour into the provinces.19 The government was held responsible by sections of 
educated society for the resulting increase in economic stratification and the general 
downturn in the provinces.20 The picture emerges of a peasantry that were helpless to 
the tide of outside influences on their lives, such as the price of cereals, atmospheric 
conditions, and population growth, but were unable to innovate in the face of such 
change due to the restrictions placed upon their ability to operate on an individual basis.  
 
Recent historiography has begun to revise the traditional view that there was a crisis in 
peasant agriculture.21 On an economy wide basis, Russian agriculture was growing per 
capita, with the exceptions of downturns in the late 1880s and early 1890s and 1905-8, 
although this pattern was not uniform geographically.22 Local studies have also shown 
that the practice of applying national averages to the locality ignores the mixed peasant 
economy. For Example, E. M. Wilbur’s study of Voronezh province, regarded as one of 
the most backward areas of the Russian Empire, found austere but viable peasant 
institutions, with 80 per cent of peasant households living in what was considered 
average or better standards.23 There is, therefore, a gap between the fashionable 
contemporary view of the state of Russian peasant agriculture, and its state as far as 
recent historiography has been able to portray it. 
 
The scope for obtaining individual credit from official sources in Russia for the 
peasantry was limited. The Peasant Land Bank in Russia tended to lend to communities, 
rather than individuals, a situation which was to change only after 1905 when the value 
of the peasant community as a force for social stability was questioned.24 Where it did 
lend to individuals, the recipients tended to only be the very prosperous members of the 
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peasantry due to government attitudes towards delinquent peasants.25 As a result, most 
individual peasants had very little recourse to official sources of credit. V. H. 
Bosanquet, the British vice-consul to Odessa, in his study of the southern provinces 
found that the provision of peasant credit was very defective. This was due to the fact 
that the peasant land bank would only lend to peasant communities, ‘and are generally 
of little use to peasants of the very poorest class’.26 Stepniak, a Russian radical living in 
exile in London, in 1896 also identified this issue, writing that, ‘Regular credit- i.e., 
advance of money to be returned in money, with the addition of interest, is very rare in 
our villages unless it refers to the trifling sums advanced by rural pawnbrokers’.27 
 
When studying the question of peasant credit further, the belief that the peasants were 
forced to turn to such unofficial and exploitative sources of credit as opposed to official 
sources becomes clear. Bosanquet stated that in order to obtain credit the peasants were 
often forced to have recourse to money lenders, ‘who exact exorbitant rates of interest, 
payable in labour if money is not forthcoming, and woe to the peasant who falls in to 
the clutches of one of these usurers’.28  Stepniak’s The Russian Peasantry can further 
illuminate the exploitative nature of unofficial credit agreements. He describes credit 
agreements in several southern provinces that are illustrative of the situation in the rest 
of Russia, where the peasants were forced to pay back their loans not in money but in 
labour. The effect of these loans was that the creditor effectively received exorbitant 
returns on their loans. ‘Thus in Samara province the money-lenders exact an interest 
equal to three hundred per cent., in Saratoff two hundred per cent., in Tamboff one 
hundred and eight... lent for a period generally not exceeding nine months.’29 The 
picture emerges of a system of rural credit that was exploitative of the peasantry and 
was not designed to improve the ability of the peasantry to set up individual farming 
practices. 
 
Reservations expressed over Stolypin’s agrarian legislation in 1907 illustrate similar 
views about the exploitative nature of private sources of credit in the countryside. 
Bernard Pares, a British historian and academic, in a report on the proceedings of the 
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second Duma to the British ambassador, Arthur Nicolson, recorded an objection to the 
Stolypin land reform on behalf of the delegates representing the landed proprietors.  
The details of the law were open to grave objection, because, while not abolishing the 
communal system, they quite failed to define the relations between those who acquired 
personal property and those who did not. It was even possible that the latter might find 
themselves in and undesirable state of dependence on the former.30 
 
This passage indicates a concern among the zemstvo rank and file about the 
implications of creating large inequalities of wealth in the countryside, through 
Stolypin’s agrarian legislation which aimed to create a class of wealthy, conservative-
minded peasants, upon which the regime could draw a large amount of support.31  
 
Bosanquet further developed the idea that the peasants, as a result of the poor provision 
of credit in the countryside, were unable to better their economic situation through the 
purchase of more land due to the levels of rents charged in Russia. Therefore, even if 
credit could be acquired to rent extra land, high rents would often make such an 
endeavour futile. This was due to the high level of rents generally charged in Russia, 
and the practice of hiring middlemen.  
Moreover, the rent for small plots (usually taken for a single year) is higher than that for 
greater areas rented by large farmers. In this connection I wish to lay stress upon the 
burden entailed by the peasants by the system under which proprietors lease large areas of 
land to persons who, in their turn, sublet to the peasants at a greatly increased rent. This is 
usually the case on very large estates, and the removal of such middlemen would be of 
great benefit to the peasants.32 
 
This further supports the picture of an exploitative countryside that was a significant 
impediment to the development of individual initiative in the opinion of the zemstvo 
rank and file. 
 
In a similar fashion, the communal system of land ownership was seen to hold back the 
modernisation of the countryside through periodical redistributions of the land that took 
away the incentive for the peasantry to modernise their plots. This perception is also 
present in modern historiography. Pipes in particular repeated the assertion that the 
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retention of the commune was a mistake due to the lack of incentive it entailed.33 That 
the zemstvo rank and file considered that the commune was an outdated barrier to this 
progress is supportable by criticism of the commune emanating from the provinces. 
Criticism of the commune on both sides of the political spectrum focused on the way 
that the commune promoted agricultural backwardness and denied the peasant his 
individual freedom.  
 
To the members of the zemstvos that Bosanquet came into contact with while compiling 
his agrarian report in the summer of 1905, the commune was detrimental because of the 
system of periodically redistributing the land meant that the holder of land was unlikely 
to improve it. Therefore, the commune was,   
designed to hinder any improvement in the methods for cultivation among the peasantry, 
though it is a vexed question whether or not the system is beneficial in other ways... 
 
As the holder of such land knows that it will eventually pass to someone else, he will 
rarely attempt to improve, but, on the contrary, he will take out as much of it as he can 
while it remains in his possession.34 
 
This is comparable to a report by Nicolson, reporting the views of a landed proprietor in 
April 1907, who supported the alienation of individual peasants from the commune 
legislated for by Stolypin’s agrarian reform. 
In his district the communal system effectively barred any real agricultural development, 
as no peasant had any motive to improve his small plot, knowing that he possessed it for 
only a short time and that on the next redistribution it would pass into the hands of 
others.35 
 
Nicolson’s sources, combined with the calls for the breakup of the commune, thus 
illustrated the prevalence of the sentiment that stressed the importance of individual 
freedom of the peasant through the abandonment of the communal system of land 
tenure. Communal land tenure was also blamed for the slow uptake of western, 
commercialised, farming practices. However, they also ignored some of the realities of 
the commune. Repartitions did not occur as frequently as this particular passage 
implies; full scale redistributions were limited by the law of 1893 to once every 12 years 
with partial redistributions  occurring when necessary to deal with situations such as 
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families dying out or leaving the commune.36 Recent research has also shown that the 
liberal narrative of the commune stifling economic progress does not entirely hold up. 
Kingston-Mann’s study of the commune found that agricultural innovation occurred at 
the same rate on peasant private lands as well as lands held under communal tenure, and 
that the commune could also act as a powerful social impetus to induce individual 
peasants to modernise their plots in line with the rest of the commune.37 
 
The zemstvo rank and file therefore believed that the structures of the Russian 
countryside were fundamentally hostile to the development of individual farming 
practices, and this affected their opinions on the causes of a lack of agricultural 
innovation among the Russian peasantry. The zemstvo rank and file identified the poor 
agricultural techniques, and machinery, used by the peasantry as symptomatic of the 
environment in the Russian countryside that was seen to stifle independent economic 
activity. This trend is identifiable in zemstvo discourses on the subject of the 
agricultural crisis. O’Beirne, the British commercial attaché, reported to Nicolson in 
January 1907 on the agricultural distress of Russia that informed opinion blamed the 
scarcity of peasants’ allotments and poor agricultural techniques. 
Most authorities are agreed that the impoverished condition, divided by so narrow a 
margin from famine, to which these areas fallen, must be ascribed to two principle 
causes, the insufficient area of peasants’ allotments and bad methods of cultivation; 
though there is a sharp divergence of opinion as to the relative importance of the two 
factors indicated. Some observers lay especial stress on the Russian peasants’ inferior 
methods of cultivation, his shiftlessness, and improvidence.38   
 
O’Beirne laid the blame for the utilisation of poor agricultural techniques on the chronic 
lack of capital amongst the peasantry, stating that the lack of credit lay at the basis for 
the persistence of traditional farming practices seen as defunct by the rest of educated 
society. 
Lack of capital, the use of inferior implements (partly consequent of the lack of capital), 
and an inveterate dislike of new methods, have contributed to the same result. The last-
named factor has operated with particular effect in the black soil regions, where the 
tradition is firmly rooted among the cultivators that the fertility of the soil renders the use 
of manure superfluous, if not harmful.39 
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Donald Mackenzie Wallace, in Russia on a royal commission to report on Russian 
political developments, came to a similar conclusion about the effect that the lack of 
peasant equity had on the implementation of new agricultural methods. ‘The peasants 
do not yet think of any such radical innovation; and if they did, they have neither the 
knowledge nor the capital to affect them.’40 For Wallace, the main reason behind this 
lack of capital was the inordinate levels of taxation imposed upon the peasantry.41 
 
Zemstvo criticisms of how the original emancipation act proved insufficient can further 
develop the view that land was not the sole answer to the agrarian question. During 
summer 1906, Wallace wrote a report to Nicolson on the state of Russian agriculture. 
The origin of the agricultural distress, in his opinion, was a result of the emancipation 
law, in particular the size of the peasant land holdings.  
That law gave about half the arable land of European Russia to the emancipated serfs on 
reasonable terms, but the allotment made to each family was hardly sufficient to provide 
the means of support and to enable the head of household to pay his rates and taxes.42 
 
For Wallace, the effect of the population increase of the latter half of the nineteenth 
century was that, ‘the family allotments became smaller, and as the primitive system of 
agriculture was little, if at all, improved, the peasant found it more and more difficult to 
balance his budget without a deficit’.43 O’Beirne, in his report on the state of agriculture 
to Nicolson in January 1907, observed a similar process. Due to population growth, ‘the 
result has been a marked diminution of the average area of communal allotments’.44  
The impression from these sources is that there was a general perception that the 
process of population growth had rendered the peasants’ allotments insufficient and had 
stunted the process of agricultural innovation and improvement among the peasantry. 
 
Wallace’s second edition of Russia, published in 1905, supports Bosanquet’s contention 
that the zemstvo rank and file were keenly aware of the economic problems faced by 
individual peasants in Russia. On his return to Smolensk, he identified a significant lack 
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of cattle among the peasantry, and the resulting lack of manure for commercial farming. 
Wallace was able to attach himself to a zemstvo agricultural investigation in Moscow 
province, which identified a lack of horses and the development of group of peasants 
who had lost all their land.45 This points towards a similarity in the opinions of the 
zemstvo rank and file and the Zemstvo Constitutionalists on the problem of the lack of 
resources within peasant communities. It becomes clear that the zemstvo rank and file 
were aware that the peasants did not possess necessary resources for the modernisation 
of their farmsteads, and that the structures of the Russian countryside that suppressed 
individual initiative exacerbated the existing problems of shortages of land arising from 
population growth and the emancipation settlement detailed above. 
 
It becomes apparent from this analysis that the zemstvo rank and file identified a 
significant lack of individuality amongst the peasantry. This was in part due to the 
structures in the Russian countryside that impeded the development of individuality 
among the peasantry, namely the lack of peasant access to credit and the peasant 
commune. This was seen to exacerbate the already existing problem of the lack of 
peasant access to capital that resulted in a low rate of innovation among the peasantry. 
In doing so, they advocated Western European economic models that emphasised the 
importance of the economic freedom of the individual producer. This underlines the 
importance of the concept of individual economic freedom among the zemstvo rank and 
file. These factors were key in the zemstvo rank and file’s analysis of the lack of capital 
in the countryside and poor agricultural techniques, and in doing so they ignored other 
factors which affected the adoption of new technologies by the peasants, such as low 
cereal prices, intense competition from large commercially run estates, and the structure 
of the family run peasant farm. This poorly developed sense of the individual had 
further implications in the zemstvo rank and file’s perceptions of the peasants’ political 
aspirations, and study of this area can further develop the importance that was attached 
to this concept by the zemstvo rank and file. 
 
 
The Land Hunger and the Political Priorities of the Peasantry 
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A major reason cited for the zemstvo rejection of the Duma is the threat that it posed to 
the estates of the landed gentry, as a result of peasant domination of the electorate in the 
first two Dumas. According to this argument, the landed gentry regarded peasant voters 
to be politically ignorant and motivated only by the promise of land expropriation.46 
This patronising attitude towards the basis of the peasantries’ political aspirations can 
further develop our understanding of how the zemstvo rank and file perceived the lack 
of individual economic initiative among the peasantry. This can be achieved by 
examining to what extent the zemstvo rank and file regarded peasant calls for land 
expropriation as symptomatic of their lack of individual initiative in economic 
enterprises. In doing so, it is important to consider to what extent the zemstvo rank and 
file believed that the peasantry wanted to obtain more land from the Duma as a salve for 
their economic situations instead of independently bettering their economic situations 
themselves through agricultural innovation. This can be further developed through 
investigation into the widespread belief of the power that left-wing agitators were seen 
to have over the peasantry, and what the basis of their persuasive power was perceived 
to be.  
 
In studying peasant political engagement, it is important to recognise that the zemstvo 
conception of a politically ignorant peasantry could be a misleading picture of the 
reality of peasant political engagement. Separate studies have shown that the peasants at 
the onset of 1905 had made progress in terms of their interest in and knowledge of 
national issues. Numerous peasant associations that sprang up in 1905 have been found 
to have interacted with broad national issues. An important development in Markovo, 
for example, was that the peasants, in their conflict with the landlords, looked towards 
national political issues such as the opening of the first Duma.47 Peasants on the right 
bank of the Volga maintained traditional forms of political expression, such as the 
convocation of the assembly of heads of households in times of crisis, but increasingly 
external forces and structures determined peasants’ political choices.48 The results of 
these studies indicates that the peasantry on the eve of the convocation of the first two 
Dumas were becoming more politically aware, even though political parties other than 
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the Trudovniks found it difficult to properly organise the peasantry, who generally 
believed that they could obtain their particular goals within the existing framework of 
Tsarism.49   
 
Among the zemstvo rank and file there was a widespread belief that the peasants 
regarded the Duma as merely a vehicle for obtaining more land, rather than advocating 
the realisation of reforms to improve their economic situation and address issues such as 
the commune, poverty, and the paucity of credit in the countryside. A Mr Norman, the 
second secretary at the British embassy, in a report on the proceedings of the first Duma 
and the peasants’ relationship with the Kadet party stated that, ‘Their land-hunger once 
temporarily satisfied (for it is hard to see how any solution can be permanent), the 
peasants are likely as not to relapse into apathy and conservation as regards all other 
items on the party programme.’50 Viscount Cranley, a British military attaché, reported 
similar opinions of the peasantry’s attitude towards the Duma in July.  
The peasantry say that the Duma ‘keep on talking’, and that ere long the harvest will be 
gathered in, and that then they will have no redress; but that, unless the Duma come to a 
definite conclusion soon, they will take the law into their own hands, and that ‘they know 
what to do’.51 
 
Nicolson came to a similar conclusion, that the peasantry regarded the Duma as a means 
to obtain more land, when informing the Foreign Secretary about the reasons for the 
dissolution of the first Duma. On the subject of the political aspirations of the left wing 
revolutionary parties,  
To the realisation of their aims they found two great obstacles- the peasantry and the 
army. The former, so far as a generalisation can be ventured upon, have but one aim: the 
acquisition of land. Social and political theories have but little attraction for them.52 
 
Nicolson then went on to predict that the peasants would regard the dissolution of the 
Duma with comparative indifference, due to ‘what seemed to him purposeless 
discussions in the Duma’, and secure land through other means.53 This perception flies 
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in the face of evidence which suggests that the peasants took a great interest in the 
Duma. It becomes clear that the zemstvo rank and file largely ignored this behaviour in 
favour of their preconceptions of the peasants’ political behaviour.  
 
It is plausible that this view persisted throughout the second Duma. In the run up to the 
elections to the second Duma, Nicolson’s sources on peasant political voting behaviour 
portrayed a pessimistic picture of the development of political ideas amongst the 
peasantry. 
From some quarters I hear that they are apathetic in regard to the elections, an apathy, I 
am told, which is not entirely confined to them; but most of my information is to the fact 
that their views and intentions are not known, though many consider that they will return 
deputies with a simple mandate to obtain land for them, and that the recent reform 
measures of the government are either not even known by many or are not understood, or, 
what is worse, are not credited.54 
 
Close to its dissolution, Nicolson predicted that the dissolution of the Duma would not 
have much impact on the peasantry. 
Still, if by purchase and by migration the peasant is gradually enabled to provide himself 
with sufficient land to maintain a livelihood, he will care less as to whether the Duma is 
or is not in being, and will certainly be less inclined to listen to the promptings of 
revolutionary agitators.55 
 
This is similar to the perceived behaviour of peasant deputies elected to the Duma. 
Before the opening of the first Duma, Norman reported that of the 126 non-party 
deputies, ‘most of these 126 are peasants who are likely to attach themselves to the 
party which is best organised, which includes the most persuasive orators, and which 
will give the most satisfactory promises regarding the increase of their land holdings.56 
 
The sources that Nicolson and the British diplomatic staff utilised to gain political 
intelligence about the political aspirations of the peasants tended to view the peasants’ 
political demands as an unsophisticated desire for land. While this does show evidence 
of a patronising attitude towards the peasantry by the landed proprietors, it also 
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illustrates the perceived lack of individual initiative among the peasantry. In portraying 
the peasantry as engaging with the Duma primarily to obtain more land, the zemstvo 
rank and file portrayed the peasantry as unwilling to better their economic situations 
themselves, instead relying on the Duma to gift them with more land. For the zemstvo 
rank and file, this was symptomatic of the conditions of the Russian countryside, a view 
which can be developed by examining their belief that the peasantry were especially 
susceptible to the machinations of agitators of the far left. 
 
Throughout the revolution of 1905-1907, landed proprietors and zemstvo activists 
interpreted the acts of violence and strikes perpetrated by the peasantry as stimulated by 
the action of far-left agitators. This belief partly grew out of political mud-slinging at 
the rising number of zemstvo employees, such as teachers and agronomists, who the 
zemstvo rank and file often equated with the far left.57 However, further study into the 
reasons proposed for the power that agitators possessed over the peasantry can further 
inform our understanding of how the zemstvo rank and file identified a lack of 
individual initiative amongst the peasantry, and equated this with a lack of respect for 
the rights and property of others. 
 
The belief that peasants were motivated by the promises of land by agitators is prevalent 
in British political intelligence gathering. For the zemstvo rank and file the peasantry 
engaged in illegal activities because they believed they could disposes the gentry land 
owners. For example, a Kherson estate manager after an incident stated that he believed 
the peasants would not have caused trouble on their own initiative, and as a result 
Bosanquet concluded that political agitation had been underway among the peasantry.58 
Similarly, Major Macbean, a military attaché, described peasant disturbances in 
February and March as indicative of ‘previous engineering by agitators’.59 The Podolia 
agricultural society also attributed the movement to outside agitators who played upon 
the peasantry’s desire for more land to incite uprisings.60  
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Wallace’s report to Nicolson in 1906 reflected the attitude that the cause of agrarian 
disturbances was due to revolutionary agitators promising land to the peasants. Due to 
the peasant poverty, in the provinces, ‘There was here an excellent field for 
revolutionary agitation, and it naturally attracted the attention of the two avowedly 
revolutionary parties, the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries.’61 Wallace 
interpreted the reduction of agrarian disturbances during spring 1906, and their rise in 
the following summer as due to a change of tactics by the revolutionary parties. ‘Having 
learned by experience that the government could not be overturned by the town 
proletariat alone, they determined to seek the assistance of the peasantry. Hundreds of 
agitators were accordingly sent to the villages.’62 Wallace then linked the peasant unrest 
to the strikes in the towns, hinting at some kind of perceived organisational link 
between them. ‘In these circumstances, the best method seemed to be that the peasants 
take possession of the proprietors’ estates, and the dispatch of punitive expeditions be 
prevented by town insurrections.’63 He therefore pointed towards the belief of an 
organized attempt by the far left parties to take advantage of the peasants’ land hunger 
and induce them to undertake illegal activities. 
 
Nicolson’s interactions and interviews with individual landed proprietors confirmed the 
image presented by consular staff and individuals such as Wallace. In July, Nicolson 
spoke to a large landed proprietor from the province of Poltava, who asserted that, 
‘socialist propaganda had bourn some fruits in areas where landlords had not been able 
to keep on good terms with their peasants’.64 A similar individual from Pskov was 
‘convinced that there was some central organisation who was arranging to render it 
impossible for proprietors to live on their estates, and by destruction of property to 
facilitate the entry into possession by the peasantry’.65 
 
An issue with these perceptions is that there is conflicting contemporary evidence about 
the cause of agrarian unrest. In answers to the 1907 Imperial Free Economic Society 
report on the peasant uprisings, agitation from outsiders was cited as a precipitating 
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factor but was not universal.66 At the time that the report was compiled opinions had 
had time to change. A large amount of agitators were claimed to be zemstvo 
employees.67 This could reflect the purges of liberally inclined zemstvo members and 
zemstvo employees which occurred after the instances of agrarian unrest in the winter 
of 1905-1906.68 It has also been suggested that the peasantry would not have needed to 
have been told that they would be better off if they acquired the neighbouring landlord’s 
land, and that the peasants were still to an extent isolated from outside political 
developments.69  
 
In summary, on a deeper level the belief in the persuasive power of left-wing agitators 
among the peasantry grew out of the zemstvo rank and file’s belief that the peasantry 
lacked the notion of economic individuality and self-reliance to improve their economic 
conditions through commercial farming, and instead resorted to illegal means to obtain 
more land. It also illustrates the connection between economic individualism and a state 
based upon law in the thinking of the zemstvo rank and file, because the peasantry 
engaged in illegal activities because of a lack of a notion of individual economic effort 
and the respect for personal rights and property that went with it. 
 
In conclusion, the prevalence of the belief among landed proprietors that the peasants 
saw the Duma purely as a vehicle for acquiring more land, and the power that left-wing 
agitators were seen to have because of their promises of land, underlines the argument 
that the zemstvo rank and file considered the peasantry to have a limited respect for 
private property, and lacked the individualism that they believed to be key in successful 
farming. This argument underpinned the zemstvo opposition to wholesale land 
expropriation. There was a powerful belief that the peasantry regarded the first two 
Dumas as merely an opportunity to expropriate the larger landowners and effectively 
obtain more land for free, which suggested a lack of any kind of individual initiative to 
obtain more land through commercial farming or innovation of their existing plots. 
Zemstvo opinion as to the effectiveness of agitators on peasant unrest also illustrates the 
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prevalence of the belief that the peasants lacked individual initiative, as well as the link 
between individual initiative and the respect for private property rights. 
 
 
Alternatives to Land Expropriation 
 
The concepts discussed in the preceding two sections have underlined that the zemstvo 
rank and file considered peasant agriculture to be in a state of crisis, due to the socio-
economic structures of the countryside that stifled the individual enterprise of the 
peasantry, and that this perception was reinforced by the very basic political demands of 
the peasantry, which revolved primarily around land. Landed proprietors were aware of 
the acute social problems of the countryside, and advocated reform to the peasant 
system of agriculture. The proposals for reform that were made by the zemstvo rank and 
file can be analysed in order to further develop our understanding of the importance that 
was attached to individual economic enterprise for a constitutional society among the 
zemstvo rank and file. To investigate this, the advantages of proposed reform can be 
analysed, to show how the zemstvo rank and file advocated certain types of reform such 
as improving credit systems in the countryside, education of the peasants, and 
abandoning the commune. This can then be contrasted with how the zemstvo rank and 
file viewed the potential expropriation of the gentry’s lands to the unreformed 
peasantry.  
 
Proposals for peasant reform can be linked to theoretical opinions of the peasantry of 
the left during the 1890s that viewed the peasants as possessing the potential to develop 
individual liberty and economic dignity. The development of this potential was seen as 
the self-proclaimed mission of liberals in St Petersburg society.70 As early as 1881, 
Fedor Rodichev, a liberal landowner who would play a prominent role in the Kadet 
party during the 1905-7 revolution, wrote that reform should be directed at developing 
the individuality of the peasantry by reforming the remaining bonds of serfdom.  
All that has been said leads up to the emancipation of the peasant from his attachment 
to the soil, and the abolition of those restrictions on his rights which place him in the 
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peculiar position of a man who lives not for himself and not as he likes, but for the 
Treasury and in a way advantageous to the latter.71 
 
Rodichev refers to the issues created for the peasantry by the legacy of the 
emancipation. In his analysis, redemption payments which the peasants were forced to 
pay in return for their land resulted in the peasantry not working for themselves, but 
instead working to pay back the state collectively. According to Rodichev, ‘This special 
status of the peasants is nowadays no longer justified either by reasons of state 
necessity, or still less from the point of view of justice and humanity.’72  Although this 
example does not necessarily apply to the time period in question, because redemption 
payments were cancelled in 1904, it does illustrate the broad direction that educated 
thought was taking in Russia towards the restrictions placed upon the peasantry’s ability 
to act independently. 
 
Such issues of peasant capital and access to credit played an important role in the 
political demands of the zemstvo rank and file’s demands for agricultural reform in 
1905.  Spring Rice, the British charge d’affaires, in November 1905 expressed the belief 
prevalent in agricultural circles that reform of the peasant land bank would encourage 
the formation of a more individualized peasantry. This would improve the existing trend 
of sales of land to individual peasants from private estates. 
 
This will still further encourage a process which has already been in progress since the 
year of emancipation, the annual sales of private lands to peasants amounting in the last 
few years to 1 per cent, of the whole of the land held by private owners.73 
 
This is further supported by the willingness of the landlords to allow individual peasants 
to purchase land from them. Spring Rice reported to Lord Lansdowne, the British 
Foreign Secretary, that at the November zemstvo congress the majority of the 
landowners represented there supported concessions in the direction of enabling 
successful peasants to buy land from them. 
It is generally taken for granted that the one desire of the peasant is for more land, the 
landlords represented at the various zemstvo conferences have stated that they are ready 
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to offer the peasants every facility to buy land from them, and the organs of the liberal 
party are engaged in pointing out that the first duty of that party is to gain the peasant 
vote by promising large concessions in this direction.74 
 
It can be assumed that this would result in the more successful peasants possessing 
more land, and thus sustaining higher rates of agricultural product, in a similar manner 
to which the Stolypin reform aimed to create a class of strong peasant landowners. 
Improvements in peasant agriculture were, for the zemstvo rank and file, intimately 
linked to the supply of individual credit in the countryside, which underlines the 
importance of the individual peasant producer for the zemstvo rank and file. 
 
Reform of the communal system of land tenure was viewed as a particularly legitimate 
means to bring about the modernisation of the countryside. In December 1906, a landed 
proprietor and politician with liberal views explained the advantages of abandoning the 
communal system to Nicolson.  
He was convinced that individual ownership would raise the self-respect and moral status 
of the peasant and would induce him to be more thrifty and more sober... Moreover, when 
his future depended on his individual labours, and the fruits of his toil would be enjoyed 
by himself and his family, it was clear that he would be stimulated to a more orderly and 
rational existence.75 
 
British political intelligence gathering on the right-wing parties that emerged during 
1906 illustrated a similar opinion. For example, the ‘Russian National Party’ founded in 
Moscow and described by Cranley as to the right of the Octobrists, ‘proposes to settle 
the land question by purchase and cheap credit, with the abandonment of the communal 
system’.76  Pares retrospectively stated that enlightened opinion had been travelling in 
this direction as early as 1904-1905, in a report on the proceedings of the Duma in 1907 
submitted to Nicolson.77 
 
In arguing for the abolition of the commune, the zemstvo rank and file applied concepts 
from Western Europe to their studies of Russian agriculture. Pares expressed this 
reference to Western styles of farming referenced in relation to the commune in a 
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retrospective study of the second Duma in 1923, which included a section of Stolypin’s 
November 1906 agrarian reform. According to Pares, Stolypin ‘had behind him the 
evidence for an economic process which had already taken place in nearly every 
western country and was being copied in several parts of the empire by the peasants 
themselves’.78 Therefore, the theoretical justification for zemstvo support of Stolypin’s 
reform was clearly based upon a western model of the primacy of individual effort over 
communal effort.  
  
To further support this contention, the defective position of education that was not 
provided by the zemstvos was blamed for the poor agricultural techniques utilized by 
the peasant and improvements in education were an important part of zemstvo political 
demands during the period in question. From the creation of the zemstvos in 1864, there 
was a remarkable expansion in the services that zemstvos offered to the local 
population. Zemstvos were involved in the expansion of education in Russia, the setting 
up of hospitals, and most importantly agricultural services for the local peasants, such as 
the provision of agricultural specialists and importation of modern agricultural 
machinery. The growing numbers of zemstvo employees, such as teachers, agronomists 
and medical staff, indicates the expansion of zemstvo services for the local populations 
which followed the large increase in zemstvo budgets from 1890 to 1900.79 In 
particular, the money spent by zemstvos on education increased from 9 million rubles in 
1893 to 25.3 million in 1906, with provincial zemstvos spending a majority of their 
education budget on vocational education for the peasantry.80  
 
The success of these enterprises is debatable. Kingston-Mann has argued that on the 
basis of zemstvo statistical studies many peasants made an economically informed 
choice not to upgrade their farms even if they had the technical knowledge to do so. 
This was because they were faced with low grain prices and competition from extensive 
gentry estates with lower production costs and cheaper goods.81 Among the Cossacks, 
people were also willing to adopt agricultural practices that were copied from 
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Mennonite settlers as opposed to those taught to them by agronomists, who were 
viewed with suspicion.82  
 
Bosanquet in 1905 stated that ‘little has been done to improve the peasant’s condition 
during the forty years which have followed the liberation of the serfs, and this is notably 
the case in the matter of education’.83 The schools that did exist were not seen as being 
particularly effective. Bosanquet reported that in 1905 the peasants had received little 
instruction in advanced agricultural techniques due to the scarcity of education. 
 
Education would doubtless increase the number of his wants, but it would also bring with 
it, to some extent at least, the ability to satisfy them. In particular, there is a great need for 
technical instruction in agriculture. The peasant’s methods of agriculture are, generally 
speaking, most primitive and inadequate, and carried out either on no system at all, or on 
such an imperfect one as the three-field system.84  
 
In the 1920s an exiled Rodichev extensively criticized the Russian government for 
setting an annual limit for the increase in zemstvo budgets, because of the importance of 
expanding the philanthropic work of the zemstvos in education, which he described as 
‘an especially heavy charge on the zemstvos.’85 
 
Any zemstvo was doomed by this not merely to stagnation, but also to retrogression, 
since the expenses of the zemstvo, owning to the rise in prices and the growth in 
population, increased by more than 3 per cent. in the year.86 
 
Rodichev’s statement could be put down to an attempt to score retrospective political 
points, although the concern that this betrays among the zemstvo rank and file on the 
importance of educating the peasantry is significant. Wallace’s contemporary study of 
the zemstvos supports Rodichev’s thesis on the importance of educating the peasantry 
in agricultural techniques. The zemstvos that Wallace visited in his second visit to 
Russia had been galvanized by recent famines to place a greater importance upon the 
education of the peasantry, but had been greatly impaired by the government.87 
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For the zemstvo rank and file, without the instruction supplied by the zemstvos the 
peasants lacked the correct instruction necessary for the introduction of new agricultural 
technology. Education was therefore an important part of the zemstvos’ alternative to 
land expropriation, and fits in to the thesis that the zemstvo rank and file considered it 
important to improve the peasants’ ability to farm on a commercial basis, using new 
agricultural techniques to make the best of their land. Although it is a possibility that 
improvements to education could have existed separately to the demand for individual 
farming practices, the implementation of such practices was firmly connected to 
improvements to the provision of individual credit and the abandonment of the 
commune, which suggests a link between education and the improvement of the sense 
of the individual among the Russian peasantry. 
 
A system of compulsory land expropriation with compensation was advocated by the 
Kadet party in their 1905 party program, as well as certain members of the government 
such as Witte who believed that it would be preferable to transfer the land to the 
peasants in an orderly manner rather than let them take it by force.88 This scheme was 
largely opposed by the zemstvo rank and file. Although this could have been an 
expression of economic class or social estate interest, the perceived crisis in peasant 
agriculture due to the lack of economic individuality posed a powerful economic 
argument against the forced handover of gentry lands to the peasantry. The basis for this 
argument was that the production of cereals, which lay at the base of Russia’s economy, 
would have been severely reduced, and this further demonstrates the importance of 
individual economic effort in the wider economy for the zemstvo rank and file. 
 
The overall impression is that the zemstvo rank and file regarded peasant agriculture to 
be deficient in comparison to their gentry counterparts, the key difference being the 
commercial manner in which gentry estates were generally farmed. A deputy of the 
right in the second Duma stressed that the forced expropriation of landlord land to the 
peasantry would severely affect the Russian economy due to a fall in the yield in grain.  
A deputy of the right maintained that it was not more land that the peasant required, but 
better methods of husbandry applied to what he already owned. He said that to do away 
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with the great landowners would be to remove the one progressive element in Russian 
agriculture.89 
 
The assumption made by this member of the Duma is that gentry farms, which tended to 
be farmed in a commercial manner when not leased out to local peasants,90 were more 
productive than the communal style of peasant farming. Maurice Baring, a British travel 
writer and correspondent for the Morning Post, also echoed these assertions in his study 
of Russia in 1906, and reiterated the argument against land expropriation by pointing 
towards a resulting drop in the productivity of the land and expansion of poverty as a 
result of the peasants’ inferior cultivation techniques. 
If all the land were given to them as a present tomorrow the result in the long run would 
be deplorable, because the quality of the land, once you eliminate the landlord and his 
more advanced methods, would gradually deteriorate and poverty would merely be 
spread over a wider area.91 
 
Bosanquet made a similar point in relation to the peasants’ methods. In March 1906 he 
reiterated landowner opinion that simple land expropriation would not be effective in 
alleviating peasant poverty, ‘Moreover, unless stock and implements are given with the 
allotments, it seems probable that many of the poorer peasants will sooner or later sell 
their newly-acquired land to their richer neighbors...’.92 This has many similarities with 
a popular argument made against land expropriation that due to the peasants’ poorly 
developed individual farming practices the wholesale expropriation of gentry lands 
would not alleviate peasant poverty. 
 
The zemstvo rank and file’s opposition to the expropriation of their land was therefore 
not based purely upon economic self-interest and a wish to preserve their traditional 
dominant role in the countryside. It cannot be argued that this was not entirely the case, 
as studies of reactionary zemstvos such as the Tula provincial zemstvo, have shown a 
desire to protect the privileged position of the gentry in the countryside,93 and 
Miliukov’s retrospective assertion that the zemstvo rank and file possessed a ‘class-
orientated party spirit’, and that, ‘Our solution to the agrarian problem always remained 
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a target of attack for our class adversaries.’94 While it is difficult to deny that some of 
the opposition to land expropriation would have been rooted in economic self-interest, 
concern for the economic future of Russia due to the perceived crisis in peasant 
agriculture must have played a part in the zemstvo rank and file’s opposition to land 
expropriation. The recognition of the lack of peasant capital in the countryside 
illustrates a concern with peasant agriculture that is difficult to reconcile with class 
interest, as improvement to the peasantry’s methods of farming and access to credit 
would have increased the economic power of individual peasant farmers, thus putting 
them in open competition with gentry farmers. 
 
Reforms advocated by the zemstvo rank and file show the prevalence of the belief that 
the modernization of Russia’s countryside rested in reforms based around inculcating a 
sense of individualism among the peasants. The zemstvo rank and file attempted to 
strengthen the purchasing power of the individual producer, and thus allow him to make 
improvements to his land through the extension of official credit institutions. Zemstvo 
criticism of the successfulness of education in the countryside shows their concern with 
the peasant’s lack of individuality. Through arguing for expansion of the system of 
zemstvo education, the zemstvo rank and file considered the peasantry to lack any 
independent impetus to implement modern farming techniques. Improvements to the 
system of peasant education were therefore designed to enable the peasantry to be able 
to implement the advanced agricultural technologies with the help of the expansion of 
credit unions. Finally, the zemstvo rank and file followed the existing trend amongst 
educated society to attack the commune as a barrier to progress in the countryside. They 
therefore approved of plans to abandon the peasant commune, and it is significant that 
this was often cast in terms of improving the peasant’s character, through the individual 
peasant working for himself rather than the collective. These proposed reforms indicate 
the importance that was attached to the expansion of individual commercial farming 
among the peasantry, as opposed to land expropriation that was considered to be 
economically unviable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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The zemstvo rank and file’s opinions on the subject on how to solve the agricultural 
crisis should not be seen as the same as the opinions of the reactionaries. Liberal 
narratives based upon the obtaining of economic freedom of the individual are clearly 
present in how the zemstvo rank and file rationalized the causation of the agricultural 
crisis. In their view, peasant individuality was critically undermined by the economic 
and social structures of the countryside, which resulted in the peasants’ world and 
political views becoming dominated by very basic desire for more land as a salve for 
their economic woes, rather than an alteration to their existing mode of farming on an 
individual basis. Such an attitude amongst the peasantry was seen to result in a basic 
interaction with the Duma and wider political discourse in Russia, and a lack of respect 
for law and private property, particularly in the way in which they were seen to be 
particularly susceptible to the activities of left wing agitators. Due to these reasons the 
zemstvo rank and file recommended alterations to the structure of peasant life in the 
countryside, such as the abandonment of the commune, greater access to credit, and 
education, which would have facilitated a change in the peasantries’ mode of agriculture 
towards a more individual, commercialized basis.  
 
These findings can alter the model that the identities of liberal and landowner had 
become estranged in the early twentieth century, which was proposed by Hamburg and 
suggested by Manning’s thesis whereby the zemstvo rank and file became alienated 
from liberal politics by the desire to preserve their dominant positions in the 
countryside.95  The concern held by the members of the zemstvo rank and file for 
providing the structures that would inculcate values of individual initiative and self-
reliance illustrates the importance that was attached to these concepts. The zemstvo 
rejection of land expropriation in favor of reforms that would strengthen the notion of 
the individual among the peasantry was in fact an expression of constitutional thought 
due to the connection that existed between economic individualism and a citizenry 
aware of their mutual rights and obligations. 
 
This is significant because implicit in notions of fostering farming on a more individual 
basis in Russian liberal ideology at the beginning of the twentieth century were ideas of 
integrating the peasant masses into a wider constitutionalist society and political 
discourse. The creation of a strong, economically developed peasantry through 
extensive reform of the structures of Russian agriculture would have helped to achieve 
                                                     
95 Hamburg, The Politics of the Russian Nobility, 55; Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 191. 
54 
 
this goal. How the zemstvo rank and file envisaged the creation of such a constitutional 
society, where the peasants were included in political discourses, and whether this was 
feasible at the time of the revolution of 1905-1907 will require further study into 
zemstvo opinions on the extension of the franchise and the role of the Duma in Russian 
society. 
  
CHAPTER TWO 
REPRESENTATION, GOVERNMENT, AND THE ‘ZEMSKY SOBOR’ 
 
 
Calls for a representative assembly were present in the zemstvos as early as 1904, and 
were frequent during the banquet campaign of the winter of that year following the 
November zemstvo congress. Demands included calls for a representative assembly 
alongside a number of civil rights and freedoms, such as the inviolability of the person, 
the freedom of the press, and of association. However, the exact nature of this 
representation was often left very vague in political addresses and resolutions, reflecting 
the desire of the zemstvos for unanimity that led to such resolutions appealing to the 
lowest common denominator of zemstvo opinion.1  
 
Manning’s research into the resolutions of provincial zemstvos, noble assemblies and 
meetings of the marshals of the nobility has shown that demands  for a constitutional 
form of government and a broad basis of representation spread slowly amongst the 
provincial and district zemstvos. Half had accepted these demands by the start of 1905, 
and by January 1906 this had increased to three quarters.2 However, during 1906 the 
zemstvos repudiated the constitutional and representational policies of the Kadets due to 
the large number of peasant deputies returned to the first Duma.3 Therefore there 
existed a large section of the membership of the zemstvo rank and file who advocated 
the formation of an institution elected upon the zemstvo principle, instead of the 
Kadets’ desire for a broad basis of representation. 
 
This conception of an assembly based upon limited suffrage endured from the 
beginning of 1905 and throughout the period of parliamentary politics until the 
dissolution of the second Duma and the subsequent restriction of the franchise in July 
1907. It has been cited as an indicator of the reactionary leanings of the landed gentry 
because a restricted franchise would allow this group to protect their interests against 
the peasantry and the bureaucracy. According to Manning, the zemstvo rank and file in 
1907 remained committed to the existence of a permanent national representative organ, 
sanctioned by law, to defend their interests.4 This system was favored by supporters of 
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the autocracy after 1907 who believed that it would strengthen the existing structures of 
power in the noble-peasant relationship upon which the autocracy was seen to depend.5 
Further research into the constitutional period after the October Manifesto has found an 
increase in hostility between the landed gentry and the peasantry due to peasant support 
for the abolition of gentry land ownership, and the gentry’s power to effectively veto 
undesirable peasant Duma candidates in the third and fourth Dumas.6  
 
Historians have sought to explain the limited demands for four tail suffrage, or a 
combination of indirect elections with a broad base of representation, made by 
provincial zemstvos and the early zemstvo congresses of the period, as symptomatic of 
a gulf in political opinion between the leaders of the Zemstvo Constitutionalist 
movement and the zemstvo rank and file. Manning has argued that the greater 
organization of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists, embodied in the zemstvo congresses, 
Beseda, and the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, contributed to the spread of 
oppositional views among the zemstvo rank and file, and that the resulting resolutions 
were not representative of the opinions of the majority.7 According to this line of 
reasoning the vacillation of the central authorities in St Petersburg also contributed to 
conservative members of the zemstvo rank and file making similar demands to the 
liberals because they lacked clear leadership from the conservative authorities.8 
Manning has argued that as a result the zemstvo rank and file had always lagged behind 
their constitutionalist leaders even when zemstvo assemblies made constitutionalist 
demands, which explains the abrupt shift in zemstvo attitudes in the winter of 1905-
1906 following the discrediting of Kadet influences in the zemstvos. 9 
 
Further analysis of the zemstvo rank and file’s rejection of the immediate 
implementation of universal suffrage can inform our understanding of constitutional 
thought among this group. This chapter will determine to what extent the rejection of 
four-tail suffrage and exclusion of the peasantry from politics was a result of the belief 
among the zemstvo rank and file that the Russian peasantry was not sufficiently 
politically mature to be part of the political process. In light of these findings, it will 
then be possible to ascertain to what extent the zemstvo rank and file perceived the 
restricted assembly to play a role in gradual change to the political outlook of the 
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peasantry, in order to create a constitutional society that was defined by accepted 
standards of interaction between the government and the citizenry. To do so it will be 
necessary to establish the extension of the franchise that the restricted assembly 
entailed, and the role that perceptions of the political immaturity of the peasantry and 
the unproductive nature of the first two Dumas had on this. In light of the findings from 
this first research question, it will then be considered how the Duma was seen to be part 
of a process towards a constitutional regime, especially in terms of the effect that it 
would have upon the peasants’ understanding of their political rights and obligations in 
a constitutional regime, and the potential for broader political participation once 
political modernization had occurred. 
 
 
The ‘Zemsky Sobor’ 
 
The Zemsky Sobor was an ancient institution first convened by Ivan the Terrible to 
enact legislation. It consisted of representatives of the nobility and high bureaucracy, 
the clergy, and the merchants and townspeople. It was a Zemsky Sobor that elected 
Mikhail Romanov to the throne in 1613, and it was last convened in 1686 to ratify the 
Eternal Peace Treaty with Poland. It was purely a consultative assembly, and had had 
no legislative powers. A similar representative assembly, elected through the zemstvos, 
was a key demand amongst the zemstvos in the period 1905-1907. The reasoning 
behind such demands is important, as it can reveal important information about the self-
perception of the zemstvo activists, relative to the rest of the population.  
 
According to Fischer, the presence of the autocracy in Russia meant that Russian 
liberalism was forced to embrace democracy in its development up until 1905. This was 
because western liberalism that entailed a laissez-faire state alongside a political 
oligarchy was not possible in Russia because the concept of the state sharing power 
with the liberals was not compatible with autocracy.10 The zemstvos, on the other hand, 
did not go quite as far as the liberal intelligentsia. Manning contended that on the basis 
of official zemstvo records the zemstvos never really supported the idea of universal 
suffrage in 1905, and the concept was always subordinated to their political needs such 
as their opposition to the bureaucracy.11 Right wing zemstvo representatives at the 
zemstvo congresses of 1905 favored a representative assembly purely to act as a check 
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on the autocracy; Manning has documented the large numbers of telegrams sent to the 
government from the provincial nobility arguing against the wide suffrage of the first 
Duma which evidence the zemstvos’ opposition to a broad electorate in 1905.12 Noble 
assemblies of the provincial nobility also tended to support elections along estate lines, 
which supports the idea that the zemstvos tended to favor a system of representation 
that favored the landed nobility in the provinces.13 This suggests that during the time 
period in question, the zemstvo rank and file did not favor a complete turn to democracy 
as a replacement for autocracy. However, it is important to consider Verner’s assertion 
that even conservatives effectively joined in a system of active citizenship in making 
political demands for an assembly based upon land,14 which indicates a desire to be 
involved in political change in Russia. Therefore it is important to consider why the 
peasantry was excluded from the Duma in the zemstvo rank and file’s political thinking, 
in order to further examine the stance taken by the zemstvo rank and file on the issue of 
broader participation in government. 
 
The preceding investigation into the attitudes of the zemstvo rank and file towards land 
expropriation found that the peasants were believed to regard the Duma as primarily a 
means to obtain more land.  When considering issues of representation, it is therefore 
important to consider how the zemstvo rank and file perceived the political maturity of 
the peasantry, which is especially pertinent after the electoral law of December 1905 
that favored the peasantry over the landed gentry. The levels of support for universal 
suffrage among the zemstvo rank and file will then be analyzed in light of these 
findings, in order to establish to what extent the zemstvo rank and file considered 
political maturity as an important pre-requisite to political participation. 
 
Even the members of the Union of Liberation and the Zemstvo Constitutionalist 
movement regarded political activism amongst the lower classes as dangerous. In St 
Petersburg there was mixed responses to worker activism, with more rightwing liberals 
preferred a reform scenario restricted to the elites.15 A similar opinion was observable in 
the zemstvo rank and file’s opinions of the peasantry’s political maturity. Along with 
the already documented tendency of the peasantry to regard the Duma as purely a 
vehicle for obtaining more land, there were serious concerns raised about the peasants’ 
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understanding of politics.  At the August 1905 zemstvo congress, it was held that the 
peasants would not be able to differentiate between the political propaganda of the 
zemstvo movement and that of the far left. 
 
Some forcible sentiments were expressed on the subject of what may be called an 
appeal to the people, the prevailing opinion being that such appeals, to be effective, 
should be verbal rather than printed, as the peasants, already more or less accustomed 
to revolutionary and other propaganda, would but class further printed appeals of the 
kind, however moderate, among the “proklamastie”, to be handed over to the police.16 
 
The connection between the lower classes, including the peasantry is further developed 
by criticisms of the British address to the first Duma earlier in the year emanating from 
the conservative press, quoted in a dispatch by the British ambassador from 1906, 
Arthur Nicolson, to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey. ‘Their friendship 
prevents them from seeing that the triumph of the rabble promises our country not 
freedom but a tyranny worse than that of Ivan the Terrible.’17 
 
This patronizing view of the peasantry was expanded in the wake of the dissolution of 
the second Duma in July 1907. For Nicolson, the prevailing political opinion was that 
the dissolution of the Duma was justified, given the political immaturity of the majority 
of the population.  
 
In a sense this is true, but it was absolutely necessary, and on this all are agreed, that 
the present law, drawn up hurriedly, as were indeed also the fundamental laws, was 
not workable, and the mode in which it had to be amended was enforced by 
circumstances. An extended franchise in a country where some 70 per cent. are 
illiterate, and composed of many diverse races, was a dangerous experiment, which 
cool reflection would never have permitted to be tried; and until education has spread 
and tranquility is more assured it seems that a restriction of the franchise is a politic 
and necessary step, though it is not in accordance with Western ideas.18 
 
Nicolson therefore cited the political immaturity of the majority of the population as 
the justification for the restriction of the electoral franchise that occurred after the 
dissolution of the second Duma. He echoed key aspects of the zemstvo rank and 
file’s conception of the peasantry’s ability to participate in politics further than a 
basic demand for land. He laid special emphasis on the importance of education of 
the peasantry in the political discourses of Russia. 
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Along with pessimistic attitudes towards the peasants’ political aspirations, British 
diplomatic correspondence contains some evidence that the zemstvo rank and file 
considered the peasantry to be affected by political developments in Russia, and had 
gained a level of political maturity that was deemed acceptable by the zemstvo rank and 
file. For the majority of this group, such development was seen to affect only a minority 
of the peasantry, and was almost wholly limited to the more successful peasants. This 
further demonstrates that the zemstvo rank and file considered most of the peasantry to 
be too politically illiterate to be able to participate in politics in a constructive manner. 
 
In November 1906 in the aftermath of some of the worse peasant disturbances of the 
revolutionary period, Donald Mackenzie Wallace, whilst acting on a royal commission 
to report on Russian affairs, acknowledged a minority of the peasantry were politically 
aware enough and placed enough faith in the proceedings of the Duma not to be 
persuaded by the myth perpetuated by extreme left-wing agitators that the Tsar had 
ordered the peasants to dispossess the noble landlords.    
Many of the more intelligent, well-to-do peasants, it is true, came gradually to recognise 
that the legend, if it had any real foundation, could not be taken as a basis for practical 
calculations; and they accordingly proceeded to buy land from their neighbouring 
proprietors.19 
 
Similar trends are also detectable in 1907. Although in February Nicolson reported that 
a large landed proprietor had blamed the peasant disorders upon the action of a student, 
‘who had preached to them the doctrines of the extreme left, and had impressed on them 
that they had been defrauded of their just rights in not having been placed in possession 
of all the land which they desired’,20 the opinions of zemstvo activists indicate that the 
peasantry were becoming more amenable to legal methods of obtaining land. For 
example, in May 1907, Nicolson reported that the peasantry were making increased use 
of the Peasant Land Bank.  
It is, nevertheless, a fact that of late the peasantry in many districts have applied either to 
the peasants’ bank or to the proprietors themselves to arrange for the purchase of lands. 
Sales, of course, have been proceeding during the past two or three years, but in many 
districts the peasants abstained from applying for land, as they consider that they would 
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obtain what they required free of expense. It is such districts that, in many instances, a 
change has been noticed, and that the peasant is now willing to purchase.21 
 
For Nicolson, this change was significant, and, ‘These symptoms show, in a measure, 
that the peasant in some districts is closing his ears to the suggestions of the 
Socialists.’22 Therefore, there was awareness that groups of peasants regarded the Duma 
as something more than a vehicle for obtaining state and gentry lands, thus displaying a 
level of political sophistication. What these perceived levels of political sophistication 
among a minority of peasants represented was a level of political understanding that had 
largely not been achieved by the peasantry upon the dissolution of the second Duma and 
the change to the electoral law, but which the zemstvo rank and file considered as an 
acceptable benchmark for political participation.  
 
The poor opinion held by the zemstvo rank and file on the state of political 
understanding among the peasantry therefore lay behind their opposition to the 
extension of the franchise to include large numbers of the peasant population. Even 
though under the electoral law of 11 December 1905 the vote of a landed proprietor was 
equal to roughly 26 peasant votes because of the collegiate system of voting, Emmons 
has argued that the liberal electoral program seemed to inundate the gentry vote in a sea 
of peasant votes which, it was widely believed, would be manipulated by extremists and 
would bring an end to gentry predominance in the organs of self-government as a result 
of the peasants’ lack of political maturity.23 This had an effect on the mode of 
representation that was favoured by the zemstvo rank and file early in the revolutionary 
period, resulting in a significant lack of consensus on the topic. 
 
As early as November 1904, significant splits had emerged within the zemstvo 
movement regarding the extension of the franchise to the peasantry. In January and 
February 1905, the majority of provincial zemstvo assemblies supported the 
constitutionalist 11-point plan of the zemstvo congress held in November 1904, which 
calling for four-tail suffrage.24 However, only five provincial zemstvos actually 
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endorsed it.25 Noble assemblies called for representation along estate lines, as opposed 
to the proposals of the leadership of the zemstvo constitutionalist movement that 
advocated equal and direct suffrage.26 This belies a difference in political opinion 
between the local zemstvo rank and file, and the leaders of the liberation movement. 
According to Manning, the latter tended to not be representative of the rank and file, as 
they were usually on executive boards, more committed, better educated, and more 
politically active.27 This evidence could be corroborated by reports of the provincial 
press that tended to not criticise the December 1904 Ukase, which had made no 
promises of a representative assembly. According to the British ambassador at the time, 
Charles Hardinge, ‘The provincial press is the only one which affects to see all its 
expectations satisfied by the provisions of the Ukase, but that was only natural, as the 
political dissensions of the capital have not permeated the provinces.’28 
 
These differences in the political opinions of the zemstvo rank and file on the franchise 
manifested themselves more prominently in the May zemstvo congress of 1905. This 
was directly alluded to by Cecil Spring Rice, the British charge d’affaires, who attested 
to a split between those who were inclined to accept the representation in the Bulygin 
Duma, and those whose’ ‘demands went much further’.29 This split was so pronounced 
that Trubetskoi, in a delegation to the Tsar after the congress, was forced to concede 
that the zemstvo delegation was not in a position to decide upon the mode of 
representation to be taken. ‘We do not regard ourselves as competent to discuss here 
either the definite form in which national representation is to be couched or the method 
of election.’30 This may be a product of the nature of zemstvo meetings, which Manning 
argued created a pressure to appeal to the lowest common denominator of zemstvo 
opinion in order to present a united front to the government.31 This may explain 
Trubetskoi’s inability to articulate the exact mode of representation agreed on by the 
congress. 
 
A similar lack of consensus regarding the question of representation is detectable at the 
second zemstvo congress in July 1905. The congress voted to support a lower chamber 
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with direct manhood suffrage, with no mention of universality, and an upper chamber 
elected upon the zemstvo principle. This could reflect a compromise between the more 
liberal minded Zemstvo Constitutionalists and zemstvo rank and file, indicating that 
there was a strong movement within the rank and file to support representation based 
upon the zemstvo principle. Hardinge reported that there was a considerable diversity of 
opinion amongst the members of the congress, ‘but the moderate party appears to have 
held their own against the more radical section’.32 A similar compromise was made at 
the August zemstvo congress, where the Zemstvo Constitutionalists were forced to 
abandon the four tails and legislative powers for the representative assembly.33 This 
evidence supports the contention that the zemstvo rank and file in 1905 supported the 
exclusion of the peasantry from the political process. 
 
It is highly significant that the zemstvo rank and file considered that the peasantry 
should be excluded from the political process in 1905, as well as in 1906-1907 when 
they had rejected Kadet party principles. It can be linked to the finding that the peasants 
were perceived to be politically immature during the revolutionary period, because they 
were believed to regard the Duma as a vehicle for the acquisition of land, and unable to 
discriminate between the various political bodies operating in Russia at the time. 
Improvements in the political awareness of the peasant were consigned to small 
minorities of the peasants, and were seen as a level for the rest of the population to 
aspire to. As a result, before the granting of the October Manifesto, opinion was already 
split between the zemstvo rank and file and the leadership of the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalists regarding the extension of the franchise to the peasantry. After the 
granting of a fairly wide franchise to elect the first Duma, prevailing opinion among the 
zemstvo rank and file remained firmly that the peasantry should be at best a small 
minority in any future assembly. However, it is important to note that the rhetoric 
against inclusion of the peasantry in an elected assembly was not necessarily directed at 
the prospect of the peasantry being included in the electorate of a future Duma. This 
prospect, along with the prospect of a Zemsky Sobor being part of a process of 
modernizing the political outlook of Russia will now be examined. 
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The ‘Zemsky Sobor’ and the Political Evolution of Russia 
 
The zemstvo rank and file’s proposed exclusion of the peasantry from a representative 
assembly on the basis of the latter’s political immaturity raises the possibility that the 
zemstvo rank and file connected a restricted Duma with gradual constitutional reform. 
In order to further investigate this proposition, it will be necessary to establish whether 
the political immaturity of the peasantry resulted in the Duma being regarded as a force 
for change in the political conditions of Russia, and whether this can be connected with 
the liberal idea that the development of Russian political discourse had been suffocated 
by previous government restrictions on political participation.34 To investigate this, it is 
worth considering to what extent the zemstvo rank and file considered the Duma to play 
a role in the gradual political modernization of the peasantry through exposure to 
parliamentary politics and reasoned political debate. It will also be considered how the 
restricted Duma was regarded as being necessary for the pacification of Russia through 
successful cooperation with the government due to the unrest in Russia during the 
revolutionary period. This section will then examine if, in light of the modernizing and 
pacifying role of the Duma elected on a restricted basis, the zemstvo rank and file 
considered a broader basis of representation and political participation as an acceptable 
end point of these developments. 
 
The zemstvo rank and file regarded parliamentary politics to possess a modernizing 
influence upon the basic political knowledge of the peasantry, even in a Duma that was 
elected upon a restricted franchise. At the November zemstvo congress in 1905, 
Hardinge described the reaction to the October Manifesto among the zemstvo rank and 
file as one of emphasizing the importance of political evolution in Russia. 
 
The more moderate members of the congress appreciate the magnitude of the 
concession which has been granted and the great importance to be attached to the 
peaceful evolution of a great political crisis which has now taken place and which has 
borne as its fruit the early convocation of a national chamber of freely elected 
representatives of the people.35 
 
That this political evolution for the moderate members of the November zemstvo 
congress was a phenomenon that would be continuous was supported by Hardinge’s 
further analysis of the delegates’ opinions. 
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Through the medium of the new chamber, an opening is offered to the energy and 
talents of the country in the persons of the freely elected representatives of the people 
which should tend to the disclosure of new horizons, and more particularly to the free 
development of national life and spirit with a view to the attainment of the highest 
political and social ideals.36 
 
The emphasis placed upon the development of national life and spirit is noticeably 
vague, and there have been questions raised as to the applicability of the opinions of the 
zemstvo delegates at the conferences in 1905 to the zemstvo rank and file.37 The 
November congress was highly divided between the Zemstvo Constitutionalist group 
and the Shipovites, who represented a more moderate group of zemstvo delegates who 
opposed the extension of the franchise.38 Such a broad statement as to the opinions of 
the prospects of the Duma is indicative of a much broader belief in the role that the 
Duma would play in the political evolution of Russia. 
 
In response to the promise of the convocation of a representative assembly in the Ukase 
of February 1905, Prince Trubetskoi, a leading member of the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalists, stated that it was important for the Tsar to establish a time frame in 
which popular representation should be implemented. Further, committees charged with 
implementing the regulations of popular representation should operate publicly, and not 
in secret.39 Trubetskoi also argued that reforms of public life such as freedom of 
religion, the press, and association presuppose political freedom, and a system of public 
life based upon law and a properly organized popular representative form of 
government, ‘or else they are incapable of being duly developed’.40 These demands are 
significant because Trubetskoi was speaking on behalf of the Moscow nobility, and 
could therefore indicate that the zemstvo rank and file considered the political 
modernization of Russia and the attainment of a properly organized system of public 
life as essential to the productive work of a parliament. This extract also highlights the 
importance that the state could have in this process, by not operating in secret and 
involving the population in the implementation of reform. 
 
Considering that Trubetskoi’s speech to the throne came at a time when divisions in the 
zemstvo movement on the attitude to be taken towards constitutional reform were 
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already apparent,41 his speech to the throne can be construed as part of the tendency of 
the zemstvo movement’s leadership to address the lowest common denominator of 
zemstvo opinion. Therefore it is likely Trubetskoi’s speech had a level of applicability 
to the zemstvo rank and file. 
 
The zemstvo rank and file was therefore not as adverse to gradual political changes that 
would have frustrated members of the Kadet party. Spring Rice reported that the 
appointment of Goremykin was seen in a good light by the moderates because ‘it shows 
a disposition on behalf of the Emperor to consider the wishes of the representatives of 
the people, and that the change will probably, and after a short interval, be succeeded by 
another change of a more liberal character’.42 Thus the overriding expectation was for 
gradual change, and not the overnight political change that the Kadets and extreme left 
advocated, which has been attributed by Ascher as a significant factor in the inability of 
the first two Dumas to cooperate with the government.43 
 
Part of the reasoning behind the need for a gradual implementation of a legislative body 
was that the tsarist government was not considered to be able to implement major 
reform independently of the moderate opposition. The government’s long history of 
intransigence meant that often government announcements inspired little confidence. 44 
This made the implementation of the Duma especially pertinent to the political 
modernization of the rest of the Russian population, because of the perceived inability 
of the bureaucracy to implement any kind of reform that could run counter to their 
interests. The criticisms leveled at the December 1904 Ukase, which made vague 
promises of political reform, are particularly indicative of this. In particular, the Ukase 
was critiqued for not provisioning for redress from arbitrary action of the government, 
and this was attributed to the fact that it was formulated by bureaucrats.   
 
But the task of elaborating a scheme for redressing these failings has been entrusted to a 
committee of bureaucrats who for a long time have held all the power within their own 
hands, and who will not be ready to relinquish it. It is hardly to be expected that they 
would knowingly thus undermine their own position and remove the barriers by which 
their power and authority are maintained.45 
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This passage reveals the low level of confidence held in the bureaucracy, as the promise 
of significant reform inspired little hope among the sources of British political 
intelligence gathering.  
 
Promises of reform by the current government were also seen as transitory at best. The 
December 1904 Ukase, which promised political reform, clearly inspired little 
confidence among the opposition. 
 
[The December Ukase] inspired the conviction that no honest effort will be made to carry 
out the reforms suggested by his majesty. The barren results of the Emperor’s manifesto 
of 13 February, 1903, are remembered, and it is confidently felt that no more can be 
expected from the Emperor’s more recent pronouncement.46 
 
These passages indicate that at the beginning of the revolutionary period, the zemstvo 
rank and file did not trust the government to fulfill its promises of reform. This qualifies 
the demands that were made for a representative assembly, because the zemstvo rank 
and file regarded the government as incapable of implementing wider constitutional 
reform, which made the convocation of a representative assembly a necessity. 
 
The lack of confidence placed in promises of reform translated into active distrust of the 
government’s commitment to any reform it implemented in the period, and the zemstvo 
rank and file therefore viewed reform implemented by the government in this period 
with a level of skepticism. The reaction to the Russian Prime Minister Peter Stolypin’s 
agrarian reforms is particularly indicative of this trend. 
 
Any proposal which was believed to afford a real remedy would obviously be received 
with immense relief; but while there are many who believe in Stolypin’s good 
intentions, the country has a greater belief in the power of the bureaucracy to defeat 
the purpose of every measure of reform, and it cannot be persuaded that an effective 
cure will be provided by M. Stolypin’s or any other ‘bureaucratic’ government.47  
 
The zemstvo rank and file in this particular passage clearly distrusted the government’s 
ability to implement any kind of meaningful reform due to the way in which the 
bureaucracy prevented reforms being implemented, which led to a belief that the 
bureaucracy was generally opposed to reforms of a constitutional nature. For example, 
the decision of the Senate to remove the right of visitation to jails to check for 
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unwarranted detention from local officials in 1906 was viewed as fairly typical of the 
bureaucracy’s negative attitude towards reform. 
 
It is to be feared that there are not many people in Russia who will regard this decision 
as an impartial interpretation of a legal text; it is likely to be taken merely as an 
example of that inveterate hostility of the higher Russian governing classes to liberal 
reforms, which has done so much to bring about the national hatred of the 
bureaucracy.48  
 
Therefore, the proposed restricted assembly was seen by the zemstvo rank and file to be 
a better vehicle for the implementation of gradual reforms towards a fuller version of 
constitutionalism because of the government’s unwillingness or inability to entertain or 
implement constitutional reform. Coupled with the support of the zemstvo rank and file 
for a limited assembly, this further supports the contention that the zemstvo rank and 
file viewed a Duma elected on the basis of narrow suffrage as a catalyst for the political 
modernization of the Russian population and political scene.  
 
Part of this modernization involved the eradication of extremist politics from Russian 
political discourses that were seen as a product of the revolutionary upheavals in Russia. 
For the zemstvo rank and file, this necessitated the formation of a productive Duma, 
able to share in the responsibility of legislation in a productive manner. Analysis of 
political expression on behalf of the zemstvo rank and file indicates that the restricted 
Duma would provide stability for Russia’s interior through productive cooperation with 
the government, which could only be achieved with a restricted assembly. Writing in 
the aftermath of the turbulent second Duma, Nicolson stated that opinion among the 
moderates in the towns and country held that a new Duma with a restricted franchise 
would be more productive in implementing reform. 
 
A new Duma, elected under an amended electoral law, is to meet on 14 November, 
and as the franchise is to be more restricted, it will, according to the views of some, be 
a more subservient assembly, and in the opinion of others a less revolutionary and 
more businesslike and constitutional chamber.49 
 
A restricted franchise would produce candidates elected from the class of landed 
proprietors, who were seen as more able to address important questions of reform in a 
productive fashion. According to Nicolson, ‘No one, so far as I have ascertained, 
defends the existing cumbrous and complicated electoral law, or disputes that it should 
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be amended.’50 Similar conclusions were drawn in the liberal camp, albeit less in favor 
of restricting the franchise. Paul Miliukov, a key member of the Kadet party and 
instrumental in the formation of the Union of Liberation, although sticking to the usual 
Kadet narrative that the landed gentry had done all they could in order to bring about a 
more restrictive electoral law in order to serve their own interests, did later concede that 
the large numbers of delegates belonging to the extreme right and left in the second 
Duma, ‘did not favor peaceful parliamentary politics’.51 The zemstvo rank and file and 
the Kadet positions can be seen to have been quite similar in this regard.  
 
The zemstvo rank and file’s case that the restricted franchise would be more productive 
also included the examples of the failures of the first two Dumas, by blaming the 
intransigence of extremist parties and the Kadets for the lack of productivity of the 
Dumas.  
 
In its prosecution of the campaign against the government the Duma undoubtedly 
showed no spirit of compromise and no desire for a truce. The war was unrelenting. In 
this respect the Constitutional Democrats (or ‘Cadets’) might have played a useful and 
participatory part, but their line of action has not been on all occasions worthy of the 
reputation which many of their chief adherents deservedly enjoy for intelligence, 
moderation and political capacity.52 
 
The Kadets were seen to have been involved in extremist politics because of their 
reliance on peasant votes in the elections, and their refusal to repudiate revolutionary 
violence in order to garner more support in the Duma.53 Therefore, the Duma with its 
wide franchise was seen as not being able to maintain a working relationship with the 
government, due to the extremist views that were maintained.  To British diplomats, this 
was seen as a reasonable justification for the disenfranchisement of large sections of the 
population as early as November 1906. According to O’Beirne, the British commercial 
attaché,  ‘Many of the classes disenfranchised would, it is true, probably have voted 
with the opposition parties, but the advantage gained by disenfranchising them is likely 
to be outweighed by the exasperation which the measure has produced amongst liberals 
generally.’54 
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It becomes clear from other reports that the demand for a restrictive assembly was based 
upon the desire to pacify the country. At the November 1905 zemstvo congress, Spring 
Rice reported that support for the government was dependent upon the maintenance of a 
peaceful constitutional monarchy.  
 
It was first evident that there was a considerable body at the congress who were not 
disinclined to support the existing government… I understand, however, from an 
informant who was present at the debates that the inclination of most of the delegates 
was in reality to support any government which could assure order or the maintenance 
of the monarchy on a popular and constitutional basis.55 
 
For the zemstvo delegates a constitutional form of government was important for the 
pacification of Russia. Although the zemstvo delegates were not necessarily 
representative of the rank and file, it is significant that at the November zemstvo 
congress there was such broad consensus in the political outlook of the delegates. This 
broad political consensus that the proposed Duma could successfully cooperate with the 
government for the pacification of Russia was probably pitched at the political leanings 
of the majority of the zemstvo rank and file.  
 
The zemstvo rank and file regarded the restricted Duma as a temporary measure, and 
the implementation of universal suffrage as an eventuality, which further supports the 
argument that the restricted assembly represented a means by which the Russian 
population could be induced to engage in politics in a modern and constructive manner. 
Evidence of such attitudes would support the contention that a Duma with a restricted 
franchise was considered to be a means to develop the political maturity of the 
population of Russia, and that a restricted franchise was due to the political immaturity 
of the population, rather than an attempt by the zemstvo rank and file to preserve their 
positions in the countryside.  
 
In 1905, indications existed at the May zemstvo congress that the peasants should 
eventually be given direct and universal suffrage. Spring Rice reported that on the 
question of universal suffrage, a surprising resolution was passed on the necessity of 
extending the franchise to the peasantry. 
 
It was held that unless the peasants were invited to take direct part in the new 
representative institutions, it would be easy for the autocracy and the bureaucracy to 
call in the aid of the great majority of the Russian people against the new regime; 
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secondly, it was maintained that the new regime to be lasting must be based on the 
people as a whole and not a class; and thirdly, that the regeneration of Russia was 
impossible unless Russia, as a whole, was invited to take part in it.56 
 
While at the same time it is evident that the rank and file of the zemstvos rejected the 
implementation of universal suffrage in the forthcoming Duma, it was considered 
imperative that universal suffrage be eventually implemented. This line of reasoning is 
also evident in Trubetskoi’s speech to the throne after the congress, which probably 
represents a compromise between the values of the rank and file and the zemstvo 
constitutionalists. Trubetskoi advocated that whilst the zemstvo delegation was not in a 
position to decide upon the mode of representation at that point, a representative 
assembly should not become a tool of disunity. 
 
It is necessary that all your subjects, without grade or distinction, should feel that they 
are Russian citizens, that no separate parts of the population or classes of the public 
should be excluded from the national representation and be converted thereby into 
enemies of the reformed body politic; there must be no persons deprived of rights or 
of the franchise.57 
 
There is a similar desire present in reports of the June 1907 zemstvo congress, even 
though it was dominated by right-wing factions. The correspondent to The Times 
reported that it was more likely to support a certain popularization of the franchise, 
although they still supported property qualifications.58 In light of the evidence that the 
zemstvo rank and file supported broadening the basis of political participation, the 
limited extension of the franchise evidenced here should not be viewed as an attempt to 
restrict the franchise, but a stepping stone to further representation. 
 
The idea that this was backed by self-interest cannot be sustained, because Trubetskoi 
very clearly stated that the representative assembly should not become a simple 
instrument of class power. ‘Class representation will inevitably produce class discord, 
even where there is complete absence of it.’59 While it is clear that at the zemstvo 
congresses the issue of the extent of the franchise was addressed in vague terms in order 
to generate maximum consensus among the zemstvo delegates, this passage illustrates 
that the zemstvo delegates recognized the need to integrate wider elements of society in 
the political process. 
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For the zemstvo rank and file, the Duma represented a part of the process of the political 
modernization of Russia. The Duma with a restricted franchise represented a mode of 
political modernization of a peasantry that was generally viewed as politically 
immature. The proposed Duma represented a stepping stone to further political 
developments, because further political developments in the revolutionary period were 
cast in terms of a process towards a fuller constitutionalism. This conclusion is further 
supported by the belief that was prevalent in zemstvo circles that a Duma with a 
restricted franchise would play a better role in the pacification of Russia through 
constructive reform. This would have been an emotive issue for the zemstvo rank and 
file. Their estates would have been endangered, as well as their dominant positions in 
the countryside due to the composition of the first two Dumas.60 Charges of self-interest 
can be modified by the belief amongst zemstvo circles that a restricted Duma would be 
a steppingstone to further broadening of the franchise, through evidence of the belief 
that the entirety of the Russian population should be involved in a future constitutional 
regime.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Peasant representation in the first two Dumas was therefore seen to be highly 
detrimental. Due to the restrictions that had been placed upon the peasants’ political 
articulation throughout Russian history, the peasantry were regarded as not possessing 
sufficient political knowledge or interest to be able to constructively participate in a 
representative assembly. The manner in which the zemstvo rank and file regarded the 
Duma as a catalyst for the modernization of the Russian political scene can challenge 
the assertion that the zemstvo rank and file supported a restricted franchise in line with 
their class interests. The zemstvo rank and file saw it as a platform to further reform, 
and regarded a restricted assembly as having a better chance of working constructively 
with the government. Charges of self-interest can be challenged by looking at how 
representation was seen as a stabilizing factor in Russian politics, and proposals for the 
eventuality of a fuller mode of representation are also detectable, showing that the 
restricted assembly advocated by the rank and file was seen to be a temporary measure.  
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These findings could in part be due to the recognition among the landed gentry that in 
the new period of parliamentary politics they could no longer be seen to be protecting 
their own exclusive interests.61 Admittedly, there were certain sections of the zemstvo 
rank and file who did aggressively lobby the government to exclude the peasants from 
politics, such as the United Nobility from 1906.62 However, the implication that the 
restricted assembly was just a temporary measure, and that a fuller assembly was both a 
necessity and a reasonable object of more gradual reform can question whether the 
reactionary attitude of some sections of the zemstvo rank and file is applicable to the 
wider zemstvo constituency. 
 
In fact, the zemstvo rank and file’s goal to use the Duma as a way of modernizing the 
Russian peasantry’s political outlook has a lot in common with the development of 
Russian liberal thought before the outbreak of the Revolution. Russian liberalism 
favored the promotion of the freedom of development of individual conscience,63 and in 
the previous chapter it was discussed how this was linked to material freedom, hence 
the zemstvo support for lifting restrictions on the promotion of individual farming. In a 
similar way, the zemstvo rank and file attempted to facilitate the political development 
of the peasantry through gradual reforms, regarding overnight wholesale extension of 
the franchise to be dangerous, given the extreme ideologies that they considered to be 
permeating the Russian countryside. 
 
The desire to curb the arbitrary actions of the bureaucracy was also a motivating factor 
in the zemstvo movement to introduce gradual political reform. Historians have pointed 
out that there existed a division between the landed gentry active in the zemstvos and 
the members of the bureaucracy along socio-economic lines that, by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, had become almost unbridgeable.64 Research into the political 
disagreements caused by the findings of the 1900 commission into the alteration of the 
requirements for entrance into the noble estate highlights this process particularly 
well.65 This had been exacerbated by Sergei Witte’s pursuit of industrial policies as 
Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903, that the majority of the landed gentry regarded 
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as being implemented to the detriment of Russian agriculture.66 Whilst this could have 
resulted in the development of calls for a representative assembly to act as a check on 
the policies of the bureaucracy to the benefit of the landed nobility, the inclusion of the 
peasantry in the proposed system of representative government indicates that the 
proposed Duma was not based solely upon a power struggle between the bureaucracy 
and the landed gentry about the future of Russian agrarian policy. The arbitrary action 
of the government, and the way in which the zemstvo rank and file viewed it as 
impinging upon the development of a constitutional regime is important, however, and 
will be addressed in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE PROVINCES FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME 
 
 
For the zemstvo rank and file, the formation of a civil society under a constitutional 
regime required more than popular participation in government and the formation of a 
financially secure and independent peasantry. Change also had to be initiated in 
government; if one of the main zemstvo arguments against universal suffrage was that 
the peasantry did not possess the political maturity to be aware of their obligations in a 
constitutional society, it followed that the government should respect the rights of its 
citizens and be aware of its obligations towards them. Paul Miliukov, an important 
member of the Kadets and Zemstvo Constitutionalists, had stated prior to the events of 
1905 that in the intercourse of law, the idea of legality ‘had been but lately developed in 
the common consciousness, and until present have remained incomplete.’1 Charles 
Hardinge’s summary of the opinions at the zemstvo congress in August 1905 while he 
was the British ambassador to Russia illustrated the perceived importance of these 
freedoms in the constitutional order that was in the process of being debated both in 
government and in public.  
 
The realizations of the intentions of the Emperor is only possible on the express 
condition of the immediate grant to the whole population of the fundamental rights of 
citizenship, comprising liberty of speech, freedom of the press, of meeting and 
discussion, together with the inviolability of the person of every individual.2 
 
While the zemstvo congresses were highly vociferous in expounding the importance of 
civil rights in society, it should be remembered that the conference delegates were not 
entirely representative of the rank and file of the provincial nobility involved in the 
zemstvos. The zemstvo rank and file by 1905 had become much more involved with 
agriculture, and tended to spend more time on their estates and to become more active 
in local affairs as a result of the increasingly meager government positions that were 
open to them in St Petersburg.3 The zemstvo rank and file may also have had different 
motivations to the Zemstvo Constitutionalists in opposing repression. The use of the 
1881 emergency laws was often seen as increasing the power of local officials at the 
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expense of the autonomy of the zemstvos.4 Such interference from the center was 
generally resented by the zemstvo rank and file who considered control over local 
affairs through zemstvos offices as their own political preserve. This difference is 
important when considering the articulation of an individual’s rights in relationship to 
the government. 
 
As Manning has demonstrated, defense of civil rights barely feature in the records of 
provincial and district zemstvos, especially after the peasant unrest had peaked in the 
winter of 1905 to 1906.5 However, British political intelligence gathering can offer a 
different perspective on the opinions of the zemstvo rank and file. Rather than studying 
concrete assertions of the rights of the individual and the obligations of government, 
criticisms of the repression carried out by the government in the period can be studied to 
illustrate which rights were perceived to have been violated and the behavior of the 
government that was deemed acceptable.  
 
Criticisms that originated from the provincial members of the zemstvos would have 
been rooted in their assumptions about the way in which a government should respect 
the civil rights of its population in a constitutional setting. Therefore, they offer a 
unique window onto the opinions of the zemstvo rank and file about the role that civil 
rights should play in the constitutional regime that they demanded. In particular, 
analysis of these criticisms can illustrate the importance that the zemstvo rank and file 
attached to the observance of due process in criminal cases and an independent 
judiciary, which were key areas that government repression infringed upon. It will then 
be considered how the widespread infringement of due process was perceived to be 
detrimental to the development of a constitutional regime by the zemstvo rank and file, 
through damaging the relationship between the government and the emerging civil 
society by a lack of observance of such principles in government and in regards to 
political discussion. The potential brutalization of society through state violence will 
also be considered in terms of how it was seen to be incompatible with 
constitutionalism. Answering these questions will reveal the extent that civil rights 
played in the zemstvo conception of the constitutional regime, and challenge the idea 
that in the face of large-scale peasant unrest the landowning nobility in the zemstvos 
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turned uniformly to reaction and disregard for the rights of the peasants in their 
localities. 
 
 
Russian Law and Civil Rights 
 
Among Alexander II’s great reforms was a much needed reform to the judicial system 
in Russia, which before the emancipation had existed as an arm of the administration. 
Judicial reform in 1864 created an independent judiciary and judicial process, with 
irremovable judges. The reform also allowed for the principle of equality before the 
law, public hearings, and Jury trials at the district level.6 Due to the large numbers of 
peasants who had been released from seigniorial supervision of serfdom, the 
administration recognized the need to reform the judicial system to compensate for the 
new post-emancipation conditions, although Alexander II did not initially envisage an 
independent judicial system.7  Theoretically, this reform would have safeguarded the 
rule of law in Russia because the judicial process was independent of the 
administration; however the reform did not completely remove the influence of the 
administration from the operation of justice in Russia, with the result that the concept of 
the rule of law in Russia was significantly underdeveloped by 1905. 
 
For the majority of the population, the concept of participating in a judicial process 
separated from the administration was not realized in practice. Peasants were subject to 
the volost courts that were separate from the new judicial system, and dealt with most 
civil cases and misdemeanors. However, by 1905 these courts were not completely 
independent of the judicial system. Legislation in 1889 that created the land captains 
obliged the judges of the courts to be selected by the land captain, and added more 
restrictions to the ability of peasants to access the general system of courts.8 These 
courts did not always have the result of enforcing the rule of law in the countryside; 
they often represented a last resort where mediation between the two parties had not 
been successful, and were also happy to accept the terms of an agreement between the 
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two parties even after the court had passed judgment.9 Judges were also selected from 
local communities, and on this basis it has been suggested that they were subject to 
influences within the community such as bribery or intimidation, and were very rarely 
legally educated.10 This suggests that the uniform rule of law would not have been 
applicable to the majority of the Russian population in the years before 1905. 
 
In the new courts created by the judicial reforms, administrative interference still 
existed. As a result of Alexander III’s counter-reforms, provincial governors could 
exclude individuals from the list of approved jurors in the provinces without giving an 
explanation. The property requirements for jury service were also raised to the extent 
that they excluded the vast majority of the Russian population from sitting on juries.11 
 
The Russian government also infringed upon the rule of law through its use of summary 
justice against its population. This was codified by the emergency regulations of 1881, 
which enabled the government to place provinces under martial law, which allowed for 
citizens to be tried before military courts-martial.12 These powers were used liberally by 
the police and the military in the period 1905-1907. Although rules were established for 
the prevention of arbitrary arrest, the police still continued to enjoy the use of 
preliminary detention and immunities from official responsibility.13 The activities of the 
secret police also extensively infringed upon the civil rights of the Russian population. 
Due to Russia’s political and administrative tradition where the Tsar, and by extension 
his officials, were guided solely by his will, Russian citizens had very few legal 
comebacks to the actions of the Okhrana such as administrative exile.14 
 
A result of the judicial reforms that can be cautiously considered is the development of 
the knowledge and respect of the rule of law in Russia. Conservative support for the 
institution of an independent judiciary emerged as a result of a desire to protect the 
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nobility in the post-emancipation period, which led to the potential educational impact 
of the new courts being emphasized due to the role that they could play in spreading 
respect of justice and due process, and this has also been connected to the effect this had 
on economic enterprise.15 The new jury courts system would have provided a forum for 
such instruction. In the provinces peasants outnumbered other social estates by a ratio of 
two to one, due in part to absenteeism among other estates.16 The reformers also 
considered the importance of customary law in Russia, and therefore introduced the 
office of the Justice of the Peace in order to bridge the gap between the official law and 
customary law, by dealing with common petty criminal cases and civil suits with as 
little formality as possible.17 
 
Certainly, the activity of the volost courts indicates that the peasantry in Moscow 
province had a good understanding of the law. Peasants prosecuting violent crimes 
under insult statutes followed national legal patterns of punishing insult and defense of 
honor rather than following local customary judicial practice.18 The general courts with 
peasant jurors returned simple and just verdicts, and led to the withdrawal of obsolete 
and inhumane laws, and this process has been argued to have an important educational 
impact upon peasant jurors.19 Due to the laws of 1887 that restricted peasant jurors to 
only the most wealthy of peasants, it is likely that these individuals would have passed 
on their experiences to the volost courts and their local communities. In a similar 
fashion, the courts of the justices of the peace in the countryside have been credited 
with improving the legal consciousness in Russia, although their office had been 
replaced by the land captains by Alexander III’s reforms.20  
 
The arbitrary negation of common law was mainly justified by the state through the use 
of the 1881 emergency legislation, which stated that provinces could be put under 
reinforced or extraordinary safeguard, giving governors wide-ranging arbitrary power, 
and sanctioning the trial of civilians in field-courts-martial. It is important to note that at 
the time that the laws were first implemented they were not considered epoch 
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changing.21 However, the widespread use of the emergency regulations engendered 
resentment amongst the intelligentsia. Fuller’s statistics have shown that the number of 
civilian defendants tried in military district courts increased from a total of 308 in 1905 
to 4,698 in 1906, and 4,335 in 1907, and these numbers take no account of the action of 
field courts-martial, the activities of the ‘flying detachments’ sent to the countryside to 
quell unrest, and those sent into administrative exile without trial.22 
 
The picture that emerges from this overview of the obstacles to the rule of law and the 
growing legal consciousness of the peasant population in Russia is that the judicial 
reforms of 1864 were stunted by the manner in which the autocracy was still able to 
interfere in the application of justice in the countryside, and the amount of judicial 
activity that occurred outside of the independent courts, such as in military courts-
martial. This phenomenon grew out of the incompatibility of the autocratic regime to 
bestow powers that had previously been the theoretical preserve of the Tsar and his 
officials. This contention has been supported by Wortman, who has argued that the new 
legal profession had impinged upon the autocrat’s claim to be the sole source and 
protector of legality.23  
 
 
The Importance of Due Process and Consistent Application of the Law 
 
Analysis of the criticisms of repression emanating from the provinces based upon how 
repression was inconsistent with the rule of law reveals consistent themes with the ultra-
liberal Zemstvo Constitutionalists and the Kadets. In particular the use of the 1881 
emergency regulations of reinforced and extraordinary safeguards was opposed on the 
basis that it contravened the normal operation of law. Secondly, this analysis will show 
that attempts to subjugate the judiciary to the administration were also opposed upon 
similar principles. This indicates a different position from prevailing conservative 
thought in Russia, which rejected the idea of a state based on the rule of law and 
separate judicial powers.24 
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Opposition to the arrogation of law was well established amongst the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalist group by 1905. The last of the eight resolutions that were passed by 
the August zemstvo congress, described by Henry Cooke, the acting consul at Moscow, 
as the most complete expression of the political beliefs of the progressive element of the 
zemstvos to date, called for the recognition of the principle of the inviolability of the 
person. 
 
8. Recognition of the principle that there can be no exception to the principle of 
inviolability of the person, and of the fundamental rights of Russian citizens, and of 
moral jurisdiction. (Passed by 80 votes to 44). Removal everywhere of martial law and 
its equivalents. Non-Admittance of extraordinary military and other courts. Full 
amnesty for so-called political offenses. Abolition of administrative penalties, etc. 
Suspension of all now-continuing persecutions of this kind. (Passed unanimously.)25 
 
The 44 dissenters for the first point of the eighth resolution did not dissent according to 
rejection of the principle of there being no exception to the principle of inviolability of 
the person, rather on the basis of a desire to create a stronger resolution that would carry 
more weight. According to Cooke,  
 
The subject of martial law gave rise to some heated discussion, some thinking that the 
resolution had been weakened rather than strengthened by the adoption of the principle 
that there could under no circumstances be any justification for the abrogation of the 
common law.26 
 
Therefore, those present at the zemstvo congresses possessed a conception of a civil 
society where the rights, the inviolability of the person, and the consistent, universal 
application of law were implemented, and judicial authority was separated from 
administrative authority. This notion that there could be no justification for the 
arrogation of common law underpinned the support for the abolition of the death 
penalty, rather than opposition to the application of the death penalty on principle, 
which had been debated at the July zemstvo congress. 
 
Subsequently, the subject of the death penalty, and its too frequent recurrence of late, 
came under discussion, not so much in itself, as it has no existence under ordinary law, 
but as an accompaniment of military or martial law, or its equivalents, state of siege, or 
whatever designation may be applied to the abrogation of common law. A motion 
condemning the increasing application of the death penalty for political offenses was 
carried about 2.30 A.M. by 48 votes against 35, the lateness of the hour again probably 
explaining the falling-off in the number of votes.27 
                                                     
25 TNA, FO 881/8560, no 47, Cooke to Hardinge, 28 September 1905, 47. 
26 TNA, FO 881/8560, no 47, Cooke to Hardinge, 28 September 1905, 47. 
27 TNA, FO 881/8581, no 68, Cooke to Hardinge, 22 July 1905, 77. 
82 
 
 
Although this was clearly a divisive issue, there is probably not enough evidence here to 
ascertain the majority of the zemstvo delegates’ attitudes towards the death penalty. 
What is interesting is that the resolution seems to be designed to be more against the 
abrogation of common law that occurs when the death penalty was applied, especially 
in the field courts-martial, so it is clearly aimed at the zemstvo delegates’ common 
opinion that there should be no abrogation of common law. 
 
This sentiment is observable in response to the police attempt to break up the July 
zemstvo congress by the Moscow police. The zemstvo delegates protested on the 
grounds that they were private guests at Prince Dolurgov’s house, and that, ‘The law of 
the land, and the ipsissima verba of the Emperor cannot be abrogated by police orders 
or even ministerial circulars.’28 The zemstvo delegates argued that they were not 
breaking any laws; therefore their conference could not be arbitrarily broken up, 
through arbitrary use of repression by the regime. 
 
The concern for the ability to be able to hold political meetings without interference 
from the authorities was therefore an important part of zemstvo opposition to the 
arrogation of law. In December 1905, prominent zemstvo activists and members of the 
Kadet party met the English journalist, W. M. Stead, to discuss a paper published by the 
latter which extolled the strengths of the October Manifesto. The responses adequately 
support the point made above. A pertinent example is that of Fedor Rodichev, a liberal 
landowner and an active member of the Kadets.  
 
While freedom is being preached to us, the members of the Tiflis town council are being 
shot at by Cossacks. Does Mr. Stead understand what being flogged in the face is? Here 
we are safe, of course, for we have an honored foreigner with us; but try to hold a 
meeting in any other part of this government, and the police will appear and act in a way 
that England would not have tolerated in the thirteenth century.29 
 
This thinking underpinned the political demands made by the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalists during 1905. Hardinge recorded that the December 1904 Ukase 
promised reforms that fell far short of the expectations of the zemstvo movement, and 
responses to it centered on the opinion that the current state of affairs could not 
continue. 
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It is therein admitted that there has hitherto been no redress from the arbitrary actions of 
government officials, that there is no equality of treatment before the law, and that there 
is neither religious liberty nor any freedom of the press.30 
 
It is also important to consider the value of an independent judiciary when considering 
the opposition to the use of arbitrary contravention of common law of the Zemstvo 
Constitutionalists. The seventh resolution of the August zemstvo congress called for the 
separation of judicial authority from administrative authority. 
 
7. Full separation of judicial from administrative authority, irremovable judges, various- 
named minor emendations of prevailing judicial customs, and, in general the strictest 
application of the principle that otherwise than by sentence of an authorized court of law 
there should be no penalty or exaction of any kind imposed, or any limitation of rights. 
The death penalty to be abolished forever. (Passed unanimously).31 
 
The unanimity of the opposition to the death penalty may well have been due to a wider 
aversion to the death penalty in Russian politics and the zemstvos. However, the 
significance that this opposition to the death penalty took on in this instance is its 
attachment to the resolution that there should be no extra-juridical punishment imposed 
in Russia, when one of the main manifestations of such punishment was the arbitrary 
use of violence or the taking of life by the regime. In the period in question, military 
district courts handed down 781 death sentences to civilians, a huge increase on the 
preceding three years, which totaled 25.32 Therefore, the seventh resolution was 
constructed to challenge the government’s use of the 1881 emergency regulation as 
effectively turning back the clock to pre-1864 standards. This is a significant demand, 
because it attacked the basis on which the military courts-martial operated, and in so 
doing underlines the point that the zemstvos in September 1905  
 
Opposition to the abrogation of common law, and the amalgamation of judicial 
authority and the administration through field courts-martial, was therefore cast in 
terms of regression by the Zemstvo Constitutionalists. As the above passages have 
shown, it was considered that for the country to move forward, the constitutional 
regime should be based upon clear laws and a separate judicial authority and not the 
arbitrary use of force by the government. An analysis of the criticisms of repression 
and the predictions of the detrimental effects that it would have in the countryside 
will further enforce this point. It will also illustrate how the Zemstvo 
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Constitutionalists and the zemstvo rank and file held closer positions on the use of 
repression than has been previously thought. 
 
 
The Importance of the Structure of Constitutionalism 
 
It was considered that the effects on the relationship between the regime and the 
emerging civil society caused by the negation of common law would create issues when 
attempting to introduce a constitutional regime. For the zemstvo rank and file, a 
constitutional regime could not exist side by side with a government that did not act in a 
constitutional manner. It followed that the modernization that occurred among the 
population through participation in the Duma must be mirrored through the actions of 
government. This is particularly observable in two key areas: the manner in which new 
legislation was drafted, and the attitude of the government towards the freedom of 
political expression. 
 
In January 1905 the Moscow nobles’ assembly presented a note to the central 
government that, while calling for sweeping reforms to Russian political life, 
emphasized that, ‘these reforms presuppose political freedom, a system of public life 
based upon law and a properly organized popular representative form of government’.33 
Therefore, for the Moscow nobility, who were typically more liberal and connected to 
the Zemstvo Constitutionalists than in other provinces, the government operating 
outside of the bounds of law would retard the implementation of constitutionalist 
reform.  
 
Such government action that fell outside of the established regulations through which 
the government could enact legislation, such as those established by the October 
Manifesto and Fundamental Laws, was therefore heavily criticized on the basis that it 
did not fall within the rule of law. Peter Durnovo’s influential political position at the 
beginning of 1906 as Minister of the Interior was considered to symbolize the 
government’s attitude towards the limitations imposed upon it by the October 
Manifesto. Cecil Spring Rice, the British charge d’affaires, commented that there 
existed a perception that Durnovo had ‘lately, on several occasions, carried through 
certain important proposals (contrary to the conditions laid down in the manifesto), 
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without reference to the Council or the Prime Minister’.34 Therefore, backwards ways of 
running government through emergency laws was connected to a backwards style of 
ruling, allowing individuals such as Durnovo to bypass legal safeguards. 
 
Respect for the normal operation of law also conversely applied to the action of the 
Kadet party. The Vyborg Manifesto, composed in response to the dissolution of the 
first Duma, received little sympathy among the zemstvo rank and file for these 
reasons. In 1906 Arthur Nicolson, the British ambassador, reported that the Kadets 
had lost much ground in the central districts, the Vyborg Manifesto receiving a 
limited reception there due to its avocation of civil disobedience such as the non-
payment of taxes and noncompliance with army drafts.35 This shows that even after 
the winter of 1905-1906, which featured large scale peasant revolts that were 
suppressed with considerable brutality, there remained a significant respect for the 
normal working of the law, which was also extended to the actions of the Kadet 
party. 
 
Along with insisting that the government act in a legalistic manner, the zemstvo rank 
and file emphasized that this was especially important in the government’s 
relationship with the expression of political opinion, and this was made clear in 
demands made in the provinces for the institution of proper freedom of speech. It has 
already been emphasized that the zemstvo activists attached importance to the 
formation of a viable citizenry from the mass of peasants in Russia. However, 
draconian laws on censorship and freedom of the press existed in Russia, which 
would have restricted the flourishing of free political opinion amongst the mass of 
peasantry, many of whom were becoming increasingly literate.36  
 
The Moscow nobility recognized the need for freedom of speech and political 
expression in early 1905. In their note to the government in January 1905, they stressed 
the importance of free speech and a free press in the constitutional regime. 
 
The absolutism of the bureaucracy has only been able to maintain itself under the regime 
of a state of siege, and withal a regime of ever-increasing severity. Real freedom of the 
press, guaranteed and regulated by law, is incompatible with it, in so far as a free press is 
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the organ of free public opinion, and necessarily bound to facilitate the organization of 
the forces of society, the creative labors of society.37 
 
The right of freedom of speech was seen as especially pertinent to the convocation of 
the Duma. In stressing the incompatibility of a free press with the autocratic regime, the 
nobles’ association thus emphasized the role that a free press and free speech would 
play in integrating the wider population into a political community under a 
constitutional regime. Therefore, the partial alleviation of press laws at the time served 
to illustrate the abnormality of the situation.  
 
The beneficial, although as yet extremely inadequate alleviations of the press from 
censure restrictions, which have been granted of late, only serve to bring into prominence 
all the abnormality of the general position of the press at the present time under a regime 
of police censorship: all such freedom as it possesses is now involuntarily turned towards 
a destructive criticism of the bureaucracy, towards the expression of a protest against 
bureaucratic caprice of power.38 
 
The Taurida nobles’ assembly made demands along similar lines to the Moscow 
Nobles’ association, that freedom of speech and political expression was necessary for a 
constitutional regime. 
 
The institution of a National Assembly to which representatives of the people are to be 
elected would be a farce if freedom of speech and discussion and the right of public 
meeting were denied to the people.39 
 
The government action against the freedom of speech and the articulation of political 
ideas was therefore seen by the zemstvo activists as being detrimental to the formation 
of a constitutionalist society, and was protested against on this basis.  This further 
reinforces the view that certain freedoms were held to be important for the functioning 
of a constitutional regime. 
 
 
Repression and the Brutalization of Society 
 
The use of arbitrary violence by the government in its repressive activities was seen 
to produce worrying effects upon Russian society’s attitude to violence, whether 
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revolutionary or otherwise. This belief was held by the Kadet party, who believed 
that the authorities were responsible for the growing use of brute force in public 
life.40 A speech in the second Duma by A. V. Maklakov, a Kadet deputy, against the 
use of military courts-martial employed in the inter-Duma period can illustrate this 
concern. Maklakov argued that ‘the military field-courts beat against the very 
conception of the state, the conceptions of right and law, and they destroyed the basis 
of community life and threatened to replace civilized society with a herd of beasts’.41  
 
That this was a significant concern for the zemstvo rank and file is likely because the 
development of the normalization of violence in society contradicted their ideas 
about the development of a citizenry who were aware of their rights and obligations. 
Consideration of the ideas expressed by the zemstvo rank and file about the effects 
that the widespread use of repression would have on society will further inform our 
understanding of the importance that the zemstvo rank and file attached to the 
government acting within defined legal frameworks. It is also important to 
investigate the effect that the repression would have had on fostering grievances 
against the government, due to the latter’s arbitrary use of force and punishment, and 
the implications that this would have had on a future constitutional regime. 
 
One of the perceived effects of the illegal actions of the government was that 
political violence was normalized, and even to an extent condoned. Due to the 
existence of the repression in the regime, for the Moscow nobility in January 1905 it 
did not follow that the abolition of the emergency regulations would result in a more 
well-ordered society. 
 
The attitude of the Russian public towards the death of V. K. von Plehve shows that the 
plan of terrorization, directed against the regime of police despotism, is not rejected by 
society at large, an ominous sign, which portends to the old order of things. But this 
crumbling, internally rotten old order of things must be replaced by some new order.42 
 
Therefore, for the Moscow nobility who countersigned this note the repression in 
Russia had had adverse effects on Russian society, namely that revolutionary violence 
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had not been rejected. Citing the warm reception of the murder of Plehve, the nobility 
placed the blame for the revolutionary violence in the repressive policy of successive 
tsarist governments.  
 
Although this could be an expression of discomfort at the memory of a high official 
being murdered in broad daylight, a similar trend of opinion relating to the effects of 
repression was observable in how the zemstvo rank and file perceived the rest of 
Russian society to have sympathy with the perpetrators of revolutionary violence. In 
November 1906, Spring Rice commented that in Russia the sympathies of society often 
lay with the victims of repression, regardless of their culpability. 
 
In Russia it is pretty generally received doctrine that repressive measures must be, and 
always are, ineffectual; and when disorders of this kind occur, the sympathies of the 
‘intelligentsia’ are given much more largely to the punished malefactors than to their 
victims.43 
 
This represented a normalization of revolutionary violence in the Russian political scene 
that would go against the zemstvo rank and file’s desire for a constitutional society 
made up of citizens who were aware of their rights and obligations, and engaged in 
politics in a constructive manner, whilst denying the revolutionaries their support. 
 
These concerns remained pertinent in 1907, because such use of terror by the regime 
was seen to result in a cycle of retaliation against it in the form of increased 
revolutionary terror. Nicolson reported that in 1907 the greatest fear in Russian society 
was that the government would turn back to reaction. Of Peter Stolypin, the Russian 
Prime Minister from 1906, Nicolson commented that ‘I have some fears that he may be 
somewhat inclined to give too much importance to the efficacy of repressive measures, 
and be disposed to turn a little towards the side of the reactionaries, who are now an 
important factor.’44 Spring Rice also commented that in January 1906, in the wake of 
large scale peasant unrest and revolutionary uprisings in urban centers, the argument 
was made by the opposition that the use of repression, ‘can only lead to the worst 
features of the old regime, in which terror was answered by terror’.45 This is also 
evident in a report compiled by Spring Rice in March 1906, who stated that although 
the repression was necessary, the longer it continued the more problems it would create. 
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It is clear that the government must continue its present policy, at least in a modified 
form, for a sudden relaxation would have the most deplorable effects. But the longer its 
present policy is continued the more dangerous will be the reaction.46 
 
Such normalization of violence in the political arena would not have been compatible 
with the zemstvo conception of a constitutional regime based upon the rule of law, 
consisting of an individualistic peasantry engaged in constructive politics. It 
therefore suggests that arbitrary violence on behalf of the regime was seen as 
detrimental to this development.  
 
Along with a certain acceptance of violence in society, an important perceived side 
effect of the repression brought about by the government was the long-term 
grievances against the regime that the arrogation of normal law would bring about. 
This was viewed as not being constructive, and would not engender the mutual trust 
through which mutual cooperation between rulers and ruled could exist. Therefore, it 
is important to consider how the use of the arbitrary use of force by the state was 
perceived by landowners in Russia’s provinces to result in long-term grievances 
against the government.  
 
A facet of this is the reliance of repression by troops in the countryside, which was 
criticized by Spring Rice in March 1906. 
 
But sometimes it was found necessary that the troops act with severity. In some places it 
is to be feared that Cossack methods for the restoration of quiet have created fresh 
grievances. Punishment is heavy-handed and indiscriminate, and there have been 
innocent villages where both sexes have been ill-treated. 47  
 
This is an acknowledgment that at best repression was merely a quick fix, and that at 
worst it inflamed grievances and alienated populations from the authorities, contributing 
to further disorders in the longer term. The futility of repression in the countryside was 
summarized by Spring Rice in February 1906. ‘The country is submitting, and daily 
telegrams are sent to the Emperor reporting the progress made. The feeling left behind 
by the cruel measures of repression is likely to be permanent.’48 This is similar to 
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sentiment recorded by the British vice-consul to Odessa, V. H. Bosanquet, in the 
province of Kherson in September 1905.  
 
The opinion was expressed that without the aid of troops the disturbances could not have 
been checked and might have attained serious proportions. There is little consolation in 
the reflection that this method of treating the popular disorder may prove in the long run 
to have aggravated the malady which it was designed to cure.49 
 
Bosanquet in September 1905, based on detailed interviews with landowners and 
zemstvo activists, connected the agrarian movement to the atrophy of authority at 
that present time in Russia. For Bosanquet, the problem faced by the government was 
intimately linked to the question of ‘How to restore a respect for law and order 
without leaving behind a permanent root of bitterness’.50 Therefore, there is evidence 
that landowners, who would have made up a significant proportion of the zemstvo 
rank and file, linked the government repression to the development of long-term 
grievances against the government within the peasant masses.  
 
Long term grievances against the state, resulting from ill-treatment at the hands of 
Cossacks and the destruction of life and property, in provincial opinion caused problems 
for the emergence of a constitutional state based upon consent. In March 1906 Spring 
Rice commented that the uncertainty produced by the repression was leading to 
exasperation with authority as a result of the lack of the use of law in the countryside. 
 
There can be no doubt as to the extreme rigor with which the country is now governed. 
The greater part of the Empire is under exceptional regulation, under which persons 
suspected of political crimes can be arrested without trial... The uncertainty which 
prevails everywhere as to the security of life or freedom is causing wide-spread 
exasperation. It is difficult to believe that this state of things can last for long without a 
reaction.51 
 
Therefore, the government was not considered through its actions to be engaged in 
garnering the trust from society that would have been necessary to convince the wider 
population of the sincerity of its reform program. Whether the government was sincere 
about reform is hotly debated, and historians have pointed towards the conflicting 
motivations of various groups at court towards the subject of constitutional reform, such 
as the United Nobility.52  
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Government support for reform was likewise not taken for granted in high society, due 
to the conflicting interests of various factions at court. At the beginning of 1906, when 
Sergei Witte’s position as Prime Minister was becoming more tenuous, Spring Rice 
reiterated prevailing opinion amongst high society that the most likely appointment of 
Durnovo in his place would have dire repercussions. ‘If Witte alone was allowed to 
retire, and Durnovo remained in office, the effect in Russia and abroad would be 
disastrous, for it would be concluded that an era of pure repression was about to be 
inaugurated.’53 This lack of trust in government was therefore seen as a product of the 
government’s repressive policies, producing among the zemstvo rank and file a view 
which supports Verner’s assertion that past government repression and broken promises 
produced a lack of trust in the government.54 
 
What becomes clear here is that the arbitrary arrogation of the common law through the 
use of repression was criticized by the zemstvo rank and file because it would have led 
to the normalization of violence in Russian politics, which would have not been 
conducive to the formation of a constitutionalist society. Linked to this, repression 
would also have not led to the formation of trust between government and society due to 
the long-term grievances that such violence entailed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There emerges a clear trend in constitutionalist thought among the zemstvos during the 
revolutionary period, which supported the notion that the actions of the government 
should be constrained by legal boundaries. The government breaking legal boundaries 
and not adhering to clearly defined standards in the way in which it applied repression 
to the countryside was vociferously criticized by the zemstvo rank and file, in a manner 
similar to that of the Kadet party and Zemstvo Constitutionalists. However, it is clear 
that in this analysis repression was criticized on the basis of the violation of the normal 
operation of law, rather than upon humanitarian principles. This theme was continued in 
zemstvo opinions on the manner in which the government acted in other areas, such as 
legislation and its relationship with political discussion and dissension. The government 
not following legislative procedures outlined in the October Manifesto was seen to be 
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especially damaging to the political community as it did not encourage the development 
of mutual cooperation between the government and the Duma. Similarly, the way in 
which the government limited political expression and debate within the period was 
criticized for retarding the development of mutual cooperation with the government, 
and the development of an informed political community.  
 
The brutalization of society that was perceived to accompany repression was antithetical 
to the emergence of a regime that placed debate, not violence, at the center of political 
discourse. Most importantly, repression was seen to generate long-term grievances 
against the government amongst the peasantry, which was seen to create a level of 
exasperation against the government, and would not have been conducive to cross 
cooperation between the state and society. 
 
In emphasizing the importance of the rule of law in government, the zemstvo rank and 
file argued that repression and government legislation that occurred outside of the 
boundaries of law and due process, along with the acceptability of political violence that 
repression entailed, resulted in a breakdown of the structure of public life. Such lack of 
structure, and the resulting absence of sets of norms in which the government was 
perceived to act, has been equated with breakdowns of trust in society.55 The zemstvo 
rank and file equated the development of these structures of public life that defined 
standards through which the government could act as being of central importance to the 
emergence of a constitutional regime based upon the rule of law. This can be seen as 
equally as important as the modernizing process which the Duma was meant to have on 
the Russian population. Through setting defined legal standards upon how it could act, 
the zemstvo rank and file demanded that the government also act as a force for change 
upon the Russian population, which would result in greater acceptance of the rule of law 
and mutual respect of the rights of both state and society. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS REPRESSION IN THE 
SOUTHERN PROVINCES: UTILITY VERSUS LONG TERM 
INSTABILITY 
 
 
There are very few recorded criticisms among the zemstvo rank and file of the 
repression carried out by the Russian government in the countryside during the winter 
of 1905-1906 and beyond, which has led to assertions of the reactionary tendencies of 
this group in the wake of mass peasant unrest.1 However, zemstvo meeting minutes and 
resolutions were designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator of opinion, and 
were designed to encourage consensus.2 It is a possibility that this evidence represents a 
lack of consensus in zemstvo attitudes towards repression in 1906 as opposed to 1905, 
rather than a uniform shift to reaction.  
 
Investigation into the attitudes of the zemstvos using other sources can be used to 
explore this conflict of attitudes towards repression that developed during the winter of 
1905 and the first half of 1906. Firstly, changes in the zemstvo rank and file’s attitudes 
towards repression on a moral basis will be investigated, to see whether in the face of 
increased peasant violence the members of the zemstvos were prepared to compromise 
on their previously held belief in due process and the detrimental effect of violating the 
latter had in instilling confidence in society and government. Secondly, the perceived 
utility of the repression will be investigated. Members of the zemstvos were, after all, 
landed proprietors, and the effectiveness of repression in dealing with the disturbances 
which would have endangered their property would naturally have been evident in their 
political discourse. It will then be considered how these two strands of opinion would 
have created conflict and a lack of consensus in zemstvo resolutions and meetings 
throughout the period. 
 
A good source for the opinions of landowners regarding the repression carried out by 
the government is reports compiled by the British vice-consul at Odessa, V. H. 
Bosanquet, on behalf of the British Foreign Office regarding peasant disturbances in 
September 1905 and March 1906. As explained in the introduction, he would have been 
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fairly well connected in local high society, and would have had little difficulty 
assimilating into it where he was not. It is therefore likely that he would have shared the 
world view of the landowners in connection with the peasant disorders. In his 
September 1905 report he stated that his sources included landowners, members of local 
zemstvos in the main, as well as a limited amount of contact with the peasantry.3 By 
comparison in March 1906, although he visited more provinces, he was only able to 
visit the chief towns of the provinces, due to the agrarian unrest, therefore he admitted 
that his report had more emphasis on information provided by the zemstvos and local 
administration.4 It is also likely that some of his information would have come from 
landowners who had fled their estates for the provincial towns. 
 
The content of Bosanquet’s reports also suggests that his principle sources were landed 
proprietors, as they are permeated with a simplistic explanation of the peasantry’s 
motivations for participating in unrest. For example, in Kiev September 1905, on the 
arrival of troops, ‘mischief was, generally speaking, successfully averted’.5 The term 
‘mischief’ is indicative of a certain frame of mind in relation to the aspirations of the 
peasantry, which portrayed their activities to be almost childlike. This view was shared 
by other British travelers to Russia. Maurice Baring, a British travel writer and 
correspondent for the Morning Post, stated that the Russian peasant was not suited to 
regular hard work, instead preferring to work in short bursts when necessary, which 
implies that there existed a perception that the Russian peasant lacked much discipline.   
 
Again, the Great Russian peasant is convinced above all things the he must make hay 
while the sun shines, that summer is short, and the time for agricultural labor brief. This 
leads him to work hard for a short period, to achieve much in a short time, and then do 
nothing in autumn and winter. The result is that there are no people who are capable of 
making so sharp an effort during a short time, and no people with so little aptitude for 
continuous and regular hard work.6 
 
As a result, Bosanquet’s reports represent a unique source into the opinions of the 
landowners on the subject of repression in the countryside, and the effect that they 
thought it would have upon the peasantry. 
 
Bosanquet toured the southern provinces of the Russian Empire, and reported upon the 
salient facts of the agrarian disturbances. Bosanquet visited 13 provinces in total, 
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however direct comparison is only available for the six provinces of Kherson, Kiev, 
Poltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Saratov. This is because Bosanquet was not able 
to visit Taurida, Kursk, Orel, Voronezh, and Penza in 1905, and was unable to visit 
Podolia and Chernigov in 1906. These provinces predominantly fall within Ukraine and 
not Great Russia, so it is important to recognize the regional basis of these reports. 
 
It is important to consider the agricultural backgrounds of these provinces, as this would 
have affected the level of peasant poverty that was partly to blame for the peasant 
disturbances, and thus the context for the landowners’ reactions to the government’s 
attempts to repress the peasant movements. In general, the southern provinces were 
worse hit by the agricultural crisis that sparked the peasant movements than the North, 
where diversification of agriculture involving the growing of crops such as sugar beets, 
potatoes, flax and grasses was much more advanced.7 In comparison, innovation in the 
southern provinces was hindered by the climate and soil conditions which made 
agricultural innovation very risky.8 
 
The predominant system of farming in the southern provinces was the three field 
system, which utilized a rotation of different crops and fallow, and was used extensively 
in Kursk, Orel, Chernigov, and in the north of Saratov and Poltava. In comparison, in 
Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Kharkov, Voronezh and the south of Saratov and Poltava, the 
system of long fallow dominated, where land was utilized until yields fell, which 
resulted in a larger amount of land left fallow.9 Both areas were badly affected by the 
agricultural crisis and the fall in the price of crops, which was manifested in farmers not 
sticking to their normal crop cycles and leaving less land under fallow, leading to an 
exhaustion of the land and fall in yields.10 
 
Such exhaustion of the land would have been especially devastating in the southern 
provinces. Many of the former serfs, especially in Poltava and Kharkov, had opted for 
the pauper’s allotment during the emancipation of the serfs that entitled them to only a 
quarter of their land but excluded them from redemption payments. By 1905, these 
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pauper’s allotments were insufficient to support most peasant families.11 Tensions 
between large landowners and peasants in the southern provinces were also generally 
high because, due to a lack of intensification of their agricultural practices, they were 
largely dependent upon acquiring more land in order to sustain their households.12 The 
implications of this are that tensions between peasants and landowners may have been 
higher than in the rest of Russia where zemstvos existed. However, the widespread 
nature of the peasant unrest in 1905-1907 indicates that the experience of the southern 
provinces does have some applicability to the rest of the provinces of Russia with 
zemstvos. 
 
 
Criticisms of Repression 
 
The opinions expressed to Bosanquet regarding the suppression of disturbances in both 
reports indicate two major points. Firstly, criticisms of repression increased from 
September 1905 to March 1906 in five of the provinces that are comparable, most 
notably in Poltava, Ekaterinoslav and Saratov. Secondly, in March 1906 there was 
simultaneously a wider recognition of the utility of repression in quelling violent 
peasant disorders. 
 
Comparisons of the two reports compiled by Bosanquet show that government 
repression tended to be criticized more widely in March 1906 than in September 1905. 
This is significant because it coincided with mass peasant unrest, which has been linked 
to the development of reactionary tendencies among the zemstvo rank and file. To 
further explore this significance, the basis upon which repression was criticized by the 
local zemstvo must be interrogated, as the mere assertion that more criticism was 
recorded during March 1906 is probably insufficient to draw conclusions from. 
 
Of the southern provinces generally Bosanquet stated that in September 1905 the 
disorders were subdued by the appearance of dragoons and Cossacks, ‘provided with 
whips, which they used mercilessly when any opposition was offered, and sometimes 
when no need was apparent. It is believed that in certain cases peasants died under the 
blows inflicted by the troops, or afterwards in hospital’.13 Although some of the central 
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themes seen here are continued, the authorities are perceived to have acted with greater 
ferocity in 1906. 
 
Generally speaking, the punishment inflicted by the Cossacks or dragoons appears to 
have been very severe, and I was told that in some places peasants had been beaten to 
death, mutilated, or so seriously injured as to require hospital treatment. Whether such 
occurrences were numerous I have no evidence to show, but it is to be feared that in 
various governments the line which divides needful severity from brutality has been 
overstepped.14 
 
Importantly, in 1906 the authorities were characterized as acting in an indiscriminate 
and arbitrary manner which is not observable in 1905. Consul Charles Smith, of Odessa, 
in a preface to Bosanquet’s report stated that, ‘In some places it is to be feared that 
Cossack methods for the restoration of quiet have created fresh grievances. Punishment 
is both heavy-handed and indiscriminate, and there are innocent villages where both 
sexes have been ill-treated.’15 Comparisons of how Bosanquet characterized the 
behavior of the authorities in September 1905 and March 1906 shows that in March 
1906 the authorities were seen by provincial landowners to have overstepped their 
remit. Although the brutality of the behavior of the troops was acknowledged in 1905, it 
is clear that in March 1906 the troops had acted in an unacceptable manner. How 
government brutality was perceived to have overstepped this line can be investigated by 
comparing Bosanquet’s reports on the individual provinces. 
 
A particularly striking example is the province of Poltava, where Bosanquet found that 
repression was greeted with approval in September 1905.  
 
An ordinary form taken by the movement, as explained to me in Poltava, was that the 
peasants would make a request for grazing land at a certain rent, and, on the refusal of the 
land-owner, would drive their cattle on to his pastures. Cossacks would be sent and so the 
matter would end.16  
 
He also presented the anecdote that a young land-owner, ‘who was a known agitator, 
had recently been beaten by the Cossacks and arrested, and was then in prison’.17 
Bosanquet’s lack of moral judgment as to the actions of the Cossacks in this report 
indicates a level of approval shown by the local landowners, especially in the case 
where one of their own had been beaten by the Cossacks. This could be a reflection of 
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the fact that Poltava had experienced a bad peasant insurrection 3 years prior, so the 
presence of troops was seen as more acceptable to the landowners in this particular 
province. This could go towards explaining the disparity between the perceptions of the 
activities of the troops possessed by the landowners in Poltava and those in Kherson and 
Kiev. The Kharkov landowners held a similar attitude and Bosanquet was limited to 
detailing limited examples of where troops had been sent against the peasantry, with no 
moral judgment attached to their use. For example, on an estate in Sumy district of 
Kharkov, ‘Dragoons were dispatched to the estate and dispersed the rioters, and the 
disturbances ceased.’18 Although the lack of further details could be a result of the lack 
of information Bosanquet was able to gain in this province, it is likely that this reflected 
less of a rejection of repression on humanitarian grounds due to the prior disturbances in 
Kharkov. 
 
The significance of these examples from Poltava and Kharkov, where the memory of 
the 1902 peasant uprising would have been the most recent, is that due process had been 
followed. Bosanquet’s articulation of the general suppression of disorders is thus cast in 
terms of the Cossacks restoring the landowners’ legal property to them, minus the 
presence of the peasants’ cattle. The landowner-come-agitator, although beaten by the 
Cossacks, had been arrested and imprisoned, as per the due process of law; the 
Cossacks were also presumably acting within the law to disperse the rioters in the 
district. Similar attitudes are observable in the provinces of Chernigov and Saratov and 
show that the lack of criticism of repressive measures was not just a product of the 1902 
uprisings. Bosanquet made no mention of the repression that would have occurred there, 
other than that the disorders, ‘were suppressed with the aid of Cossacks and 
dragoons’,19 although this may be due to the lack of detail that he had for this province. 
 
However, in March 1906, the feeling is very different. Bosanquet described how the 
peasants in Poltava had been beaten by the Cossacks in various localities, and used the 
example of an officer named F. V. Filonov’s actions in the village of Sorochintsy as a 
standard for the conduct of the authorities in the province.  
 
Filonov then assembled the villagers and ordered them on their knees in the snow. He 
kept the majority of them in this attitude for four and a-half hours, and meanwhile a 
number of peasants were mercilessly beaten by the Cossacks’ nagiaikas, after being 
struck, in some cases, by Filonov. The Jews were then separated from the Orthodox 
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peasants, were ordered to kneel apart from the rest, and were indiscriminately beaten by 
the Cossacks.20 
 
Similarly, in Ekaterinoslav, Bosanquet reported that there had been instances where 
peasants had been shot without trial, and that the Cossacks ‘seem to have flogged the 
peasants mercilessly, and some of the later were reported to have died from the 
effects.’21 The suppression of disorders was seen as equally brutal in Saratov. Cossacks 
were sent, and ‘flogged the peasants mercilessly. I was told of a case where Cossacks... 
beat the peasants on the soles of their feet so severely that some died and others were 
taken to hospital.’22 In the Saratov case, the development of a more scrutiny being 
applied to repression may have developed from November 1905. The correspondent for 
The Times reported that ‘According to news in Saratoff, scores of peasants are brought 
in as prisoners daily. All bear marks of shocking ill treatment.’23 
 
In these three provinces, criticism of repression became much more pronounced in 
March 1906. The authorities and troops were seen to be less humane, and importantly 
acted with less regards to law and in a more arbitrary manner. It is therefore clear that in 
March 1906 government repression was explained in terms of such arbitrary brutality 
by members of the zemstvos, when they would have had less opportunity to witness it 
first-hand due to the exodus of landowners to the towns. 
 
In the Kherson and Kiev districts, criticisms of repression were sustained between 
September 1905 and March 1906, however a similar pattern to the districts of Poltava, 
Kharkov, and Saratov emerges. In September 1905, troops in Kherson ‘were sent to 
many estates, and the mounted troops on several occasions treated the peasants with 
great severity’. Bosanquet also presented many other anecdotes of peasants being forced 
to kneel for hours, and troops shooting peasants.24 Similarly in Kiev province, 
Bosanquet stated that for 1905, ‘I cannot judge of the general behavior of the troops, but 
in a number of cases they certainly beat the peasants most mercilessly, and their conduct 
does not seem to have been always irreproachable.’25 Perceptions that repression 
utilized excessive brutality arguably become much more common in 1906, in line with 
the escalation of the use of troops by the government. 
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What is observable in both provinces is that although the repression was seen as severe, 
it was generally cast in terms of restoring the legal order of the countryside. For 
example, on a Kherson estate the peasants had forced the landowner to sign an 
agreement that lowered rents and allowed them to be paid in kind, the dismissal of 
migrant laborers, and reduced rates for tack. Upon the arrival of troops, ‘The peasants 
were compelled to restore the agreement which they had extracted by force, and the 
acute stage of the movement was over.’26 In the Demidovka district of Kherson, 
although the peasants were kept on their knees by the troops, ‘They were ordered to 
give up the ringleaders of the movement and twenty-eight arrests were made.’27 In these 
examples the troops were therefore clearly acting to make arrests, and restore stolen 
property, or evict peasant livestock from private land. A similar pattern is observable in 
Kiev. For example, the district of Cherkassy witnessed a large amount of arson, which 
the troops suppressed upon their arrival.28 The use of troops to restore order was also 
evident in Vasilkov district. The peasants on two large estates forced laborers from 
other districts to cease work, and ‘In both cases dragoons were summoned for the 
maintenance of order. In the former case seven arrests were made and probably a far 
larger number in the latter.’29 Therefore, in these provinces, it is clear that while 
repression was seen as being needlessly severe, it generally operated within the law 
through the arrest of malefactors and the restoration of property.  
 
Repression was much more vociferously opposed in Kiev and Kherson than in March 
1906. In Kiev, the news that the Cossacks were coming was enough for the villagers to 
resort to brutal methods to ensure their own protection. ‘According to the story which I 
heard, when it was known that the Cossacks would be sent, the villagers beat the 
ringleaders to death and handed other disturbers of the peace over to the authorities.’30 
In Kherson, troops seem to have shot the peasant in an arbitrary manner. 
 
The arrival of troops limited the area of disturbance. In many places they have beaten the 
peasants most severely, and I was informed that on that occasion eleven peasants were 
shot. At an estate near the village of Avilove, where an encounter took place between 
soldiers and peasants, five of the latter were said to have been killed. Other similar cases 
may have occurred.31   
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The widespread shooting of peasants in the Kherson district, and the connivance of the 
Cossacks in brutal peasant vigilantism brings out the assertion made by Smith above 
that in 1906 government repression was characterized as being much more 
indiscriminate and arbitrary, which as the preceding chapter has shown was seen by the 
zemstvo rank and file as not being conducive to the formation of a constitutional 
regime. 
 
Comparisons of these two reports show that the landowners and zemstvo activists who 
would have formed the vast majority of Bosanquet’s sources became more critical of 
the repression carried out by the authorities in 1906, although there were some 
criticisms based upon the methods used by the troops in September 1905. The major 
difference is a shift towards defining government repression in terms of unbridled 
ferocity that was carried out in an indiscriminate manner, with little legal precedent 
other than the use of the 1881 emergency regulations. These observations can be further 
developed through the analysis of wider political discourse of the 1906 period.  
 
Zemstvo criticisms of repression that are apparent in Bosanquet’s reports are also 
detectable in the wider political discourse of the period, which suggests that these 
opinions were much more widely held than just the six southern provinces that are 
comparable from 1905 to 1906. The use of Cossacks in the widespread government 
repression led to the perception in the towns and cities that the countryside was in a 
state of anarchy, fueled by the repressive actions of the government, where the rule of 
law was not recognized. In March 1906, the British charge d’affaires, Cecil Spring Rice, 
articulated the perception of the impotency of the rule of law in the countryside. 
  
The government itself seems to be convinced of the necessity of a policy of repression. I 
am informed that in the provinces the different provincial governors rule their provinces 
at their discretion. The law is in abeyance, and there is no security for person or 
freedom.32 
 
This perception was obviously so pronounced that the Moscow provincial zemstvo in its 
March sitting according to Spring Rice, ‘demanded the repeal of ‘exceptional measures’ 
and the restoration of the ‘legal order of things’, and their resolution voices, it seems, 
the sentiment of the country.’33 This sentiment was recorded by British political 
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intelligence gathering at a time when political protest against repression by the 
zemstvos was at low ebb. 
 
A report on the political situation of the country compiled in July 1906 by the British 
ambassador to Russia, Arthur Nicolson, shows that similar fears were present in regards 
to the countryside, and that there was a prevailing impression that the government was 
reverting to old methods of repression outside of legal restrictions to subjugate the 
countryside. 
 
At the same time measures are being taken for checking the agitation throughout the 
country and for the re-establishment of order. It is to be hoped that in the exercise of these 
measures due moderation will be shown, and that a curb will be placed on the zeal of the 
local authorities. There are symptoms that some of the evils of the old reactionary system 
will not have extirpated, and I am afraid that there may be a disposition to recoil too far 
back.’34 
 
According to Nicolson’s sources, the local authorities still exhibited certain zeal when it 
came to repressing disorders in the countryside. This zeal was not viewed positively by 
the wider population outside of government, because it becomes apparent in this 
passage that these methods were associated with the old political order. However, it is 
worth noting that Nicolson in January 1907 was of the opinion that repression of 
disorders in the countryside had been carried out in a relatively defensible manner. 
Although he pointed out that innocent people may have been executed by the courts 
martial he stated that, ‘I do not think that, on the whole, their administration of the 
powers confided to them has been too arbitrarily exercised.’35 
 
The demonization of the Cossacks by the liberals supports the contention that 
government repression created an abeyance of law and order in the countryside. Spring 
Rice in March 1906 explained their wide use by the government in terms of their loyalty 
to the throne and their predatory instincts. 
 
…their known devotion to the throne and the entire want of sympathy with the peasants 
and the town population, and the certainty that they would obey without hesitation any 
order giving scope to their predatory instincts .They have been extolled by the reactionary 
parties as the bulwarks of the autocracy and the saviors of Russia, and vilified by the 
liberals as the instruments of tyranny and monsters of ferocity.36 
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Such vilification is likely to have been more to do with the manner in which the 
Cossacks were employed by the government, rather than observation. As already noted, 
there was a considerable exodus of landowners from the countryside to the towns during 
the agrarian disturbances for their own safety. Also, it is worth noting that the Cossacks 
did not always perform their duties willingly. In 1905 instances of Cossacks refusing to 
carry out repression have been documented, as well as their lack of pride in carrying out 
repressive duties, and by 1906 there were mutinies in many Cossack regiments.37 This 
also applied to the regular army; conflict between the Ministry of War and the Ministry 
of the Interior has been studied by both Fuller and Bushnell, and has shown that many 
of the soldiers involved in repression in European Russia had in fact been involved in 
mutinies following the October Manifesto.38 
 
Bosanquet’s reports in September 1905 and March 1906 has significant implications for 
the traditional model of the zemstvo rank and file’s shift to the right during the winter of 
1905-6, conditioned in part by the rise in peasant unrest. As well as increasing in 
volume recorded, the criticisms of repression in the southern provinces changed 
qualitatively between September 1905 and March 1906. Landowner opinion in the 
provinces of Saratov, Poltava, Kherson, and to a lesser extent Chernigov and Saratov 
had changed by March 1906 to portray repression as increasingly arbitrary, and going 
beyond the bounds of what would have been lawfully acceptable, whereas in 1905 
repression was seen to have been acting to redress grievances and punish malefactors. 
While the brutality of the repression was criticized in September 1905 in Kherson and 
Kiev, criticisms in 1906 reflected the same trends as the previous provinces. 
Comparison of these findings to the wider political discourse in the period shows the 
repression was seen to create a state of lawlessness in the countryside.    
 
Although Nicolson’s comment in January 1907 could indicate a certain brutalization of 
informed public opinion towards the repression carried out in the countryside, it could 
be argued that it was partly influenced by a recognition of the utility of repression in the 
protection of the stability and assets in the countryside, such as estates, agricultural 
machinery, and positions of local power and prestige. Although the increase in 
repression carried out by the authorities in provincial Russia occasioned an increase in 
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zemstvo protest on points of law, which was mirrored by wider public opinion in 1906, 
it was also matched by a certain acceptance of the utility of repression in pacifying the 
countryside. 
 
 
Recognition of the Utility of Repression 
 
The second significant feature of comparisons of the two reports on the condition of the 
countryside compiled by Bosanquet is the almost universal acceptance of the utility of 
using repression to suppress disturbances. This is reflective of the zemstvo rank and 
files’ positions as country proprietors, which was the result of the process by which the 
landed gentry became more involved in agricultural affairs towards the beginning of the 
twentieth century.39  It is conceivable that this agrarian orientation would have created 
an acceptance of the utility of repression in the role of protecting property and the 
stability of provincial Russia. How the utility of repression was articulated in both 
Bosanquet’s reports and wider political discourse attributable to the zemstvo rank and 
file will bring out their conceptualization of a well ordered constitutional society. 
Therefore, two areas will be addressed; how the troops were seen to be successful at 
restoring law and order, and how this state of normalcy was defined.   
 
A detailed analysis of the findings that Bosanquet presented for each province finds a 
general acceptance of the effectiveness of the troops sent to quell disorders. Bosanquet 
visited eight provinces during 1905 and eleven provinces in 1906, six of which had 
been visited in 1905. Out of the 19 individual provincial reports thus generated, none 
criticize the troops of being ineffective and eleven contain acknowledgments of the 
effectiveness of the troops. Only one provincial report from Kherson in September 1905 
alludes to future long-term issues caused by the use of troops to pacify the 
countryside.40  
 
Of the southern provinces generally, Bosanquet commented that repression in both 1905 
and in March 1906 had been very effective in both ending and deterring peasant 
violence. In September 1905, Bosanquet stated that across the southern provinces 
generally the disorders were subdued rapidly by the appearance of Cossacks and 
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dragoons.41 Similarly, in March 1906 peasants had acted with impunity before the 
arrival of troops, ‘But the arrival of troops, the arrest of large numbers of peasants, and 
the merciless chastisement inflicted upon the peasants by the Cossacks and dragoons 
entirely altered their opinion’.42 Therefore, the prevailing finding’s for his reports 
suggests that repression was generally viewed as effective in the short term. 
 
The troops were praised due to the effect that they had in averting more serious 
disorders. Reports about this effect of the troops are simplistic, and state very simply 
that the agrarian movements were halted by the arrival of troops, such as in Kharkov 
and Poltava, where the police ‘acted with effect’.43 Similar effects of the arrival of 
troops were recorded in 1906, for example in Kherson, ‘The arrival of troops limited the 
area of disturbance’,44 and that in Poltava the arrival of the Cossacks was enough for the 
peasants to remember the punishment they received at the hands of the Cossacks three 
years prior.45 Out of the eight reports on individual provinces where the effectiveness of 
repression was not acknowledged, in the provinces of Kharkov, Orel, and Voronezh the 
peasant disorders had subsided by the time that troops arrived in 1906.46 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that repression in these provinces and southern Russia generally 
was seen by the community of informed opinion to have effectively achieved its aims. 
 
In wider circles of informed public opinion, especially in the towns, similar perceptions 
are detectable towards the effectiveness of the authorities in repressing the agitation of 
the far left among the workers. Government arrests and summary execution after trial 
by court-martial, were presented as effectively quelling armed insurrection. In the 
aftermath of the most intense insurrections by workers Spring Rice reported that, ‘There 
is yet no sign that the extremists have made any real progress with the army, and the 
recent arrests seem to have paralyzed the activity of the terrorists.’47 In particular, the 
Cossacks, who were vilified for their activities in the countryside, are praised for their 
effectiveness at putting down demonstrations. In response to calls by the revolutionary 
party for the inhabitants of St Petersburg to rise up, ‘As soon as any meeting was 
detected in the streets, the Cossacks assembled at the signal of a police whistle and 
dispersed the crowd. This was affected throughout the day without difficulty or loss of 
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life.’48 Positive reports of the repression of strikers and insurrections in the towns are 
therefore similar to accounts of the effectiveness of repression in the towns. 
 
The Moscow congress of noble marshals in in January 1906 published a resolution that 
broadly conformed to this undercurrent of opinion. In reference to government 
repression they stated that, ‘These necessary measures must be continued until the 
turmoil has been suppressed and terminated in order to protect the peaceful population 
from revolutionary actions and uprisings.’49 This indicates a further level of universality 
to the approval expressed by the zemstvo rank and file, as well as the importance of 
retaining the local and national status quo. 
 
This return to a state of normalcy in the countryside is likely to have been highly sought 
after by the zemstvo rank and file, whose assets predominantly were located in the 
countryside. This was acknowledged by the Russian Prime Minister in 1906, Peter 
Stolypin, in an interview with Nicolson in September.  
 
He added that the recent zemstvo elections were satisfactory in the sense that the more 
conservative elements had been returned in the majority of cases, and there were certainly 
indications that many were anxious to see a return to a more normal condition of affairs.50 
 
Although as a senior statesman, and therefore likely to attempt to portray wide domestic 
support of his policy to foreign dignitaries, Stolypin was also a large landowner and so 
would have had a good understanding of the preoccupations of that class.  This passage 
therefore suggests that the zemstvo rank and file in September 1906 would have 
welcomed repressive actions by the government as a means to an end of pacifying the 
countryside. Viscount Cranley, a military attaché, in a report on the agrarian troubles in 
July 1906 reported on the optimistic attitude in the provinces regarding the effect of the 
repression of the winter. ‘The peasants have been severely flogged and cowed by the 
troops, and the cavalry distributed about the various provinces, or ready at hand in case 
of need, may be sufficient to  prevent a general outbreak in the summer.51 Repression is 
portrayed here as more of a necessity, in order to preserve the provincial status quo. 
 
                                                     
48 TNA, FO 881/8580, no 28, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 16 May 1905, 28. 
49 ‘Resolutions of the Moscow Congress of Noble Marshals of 11 January 1906’, in Gregory Freeze (ed.), 
From Supplication to Revolution: a Documentary History of Imperial Russia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 200. 
50 TNA, FO 881/8821, no 29, Nicolson to Grey, 6 September 1906, 32. 
51 TNA, FO 881/8795, no 66, Cranley to Grey, 31 July 1906, 68. 
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The similarity between the descriptions of the utility of repression between town and 
countryside is significant. There is a detectable emphasis on the importance of the 
restoration of law and order in both the town and countryside, even at the cost of 
compromising on principles such as the due process of law. Spring Rice’s emphasis on 
the safety of the Emperor is particularly illustrative of this perception. 
 
The measures of the police against the terrorists appear to have been fairly successful. 
The Emperor, it is true, continues to be a prisoner at Tsarkoe Seloe, nor will he hold the 
usual spring review at St. Petersburgh, but members of the Imperial Family are 
occasionally seen in public, and General Trepoff is still alive.52 
 
Therefore, whilst the zemstvo rank and file can be shown to have become more critical 
of the repression meted out by the regime as the agrarian unrest developed throughout 
1905-1907, it is evident that there was a simultaneous recognition of the usefulness of 
repression in protecting the social order and their assets in the countryside.  
 
The desire for a state of normalcy in the countryside was enough for the practice of 
landowners hiring and arming guards for their estates to be a noticeable and significant 
development for the representatives of British interests in Russia. Spring Rice reported 
details of landowners paying for armed guards for their estates, who, ‘through personal 
interest or by dint of judicious distribution of private funds, have succeeded in obtaining 
military assistance in quelling trouble among their serfs’.53 Bosanquet reported a similar 
movement among the landowners of the southern provinces. ‘Other landowners, 
however, refused to be intimidated, and organized an impromptu guard with such men 
and means of defense as were available; these proprietors not infrequently were 
unmolested.’54 This practice is significant, because it further illustrates the importance 
that was attached to the maintenance of the landowner’s privileged positions in the 
countryside. Even though the landed nobility had declined in terms of area of land 
owned from the emancipation to 1905, research has shown that the landed nobility 
retained a level of dominance in the countryside through access to easy credit and their 
control of the zemstvos.55 It also illustrates a desire to return to a state of peaceful law 
and order in the countryside.  
 
                                                     
52 TNA, FO 881/8580, no 22, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 10 May 1905, 24. 
53 TNA, FO 881/8710, no. 21, Spring Rice to Grey, December 30 1905, 28. 
54 TNA, FO 881/8560, no 48, Bosanquet to Smith, 25 September 1905, 48. 
55 Emmons, ‘The Russian Landed Gentry and Politics’, 375-76. 
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Although government repression was criticized on the basis of its operation outside of 
the law, it appears that repression was seen to be useful in retaining the existing 
hierarchy in the countryside. This applied strictly to the short term; in the long term the 
use of arbitrary repression was associated with alienating the general population from a 
potential constitutional regime and the perpetuation of violence in society. The fact that 
even though repression was criticized more vociferously in 1906 the landed nobility still 
recognized the utility and effectiveness of the troops could be seen as an offshoot of 
their positions in the countryside. While repression was important in retaining the 
country hierarchy, the acceptance of its utility also indicates a desire to return the 
Russian countryside to a state of normal law and order, which would have been 
particularly important to the zemstvo conception of a constitutional regime. 
 
 
The Lack of Consensus on Repression 
 
The recognition of the utility of repression in safeguarding property and law in the 
countryside, when viewed alongside how repression was criticized in 1906, creates an 
interesting conflict that can in part be used to explain the lack of protest against 
repression in official zemstvo records in 1906. The usefulness of repression in 
safeguarding law and the positions of the landed gentry in the countryside conflicted 
with the principled opposition to the way in which repression contravened the normal 
operation of law in a constitutional regime, which resulted in a lack of a concrete 
position against government repression in 1906 that is observable in alternative material 
on zemstvo political opinions to official zemstvo records. This is demonstrable through 
analysis of the zemstvo rank and file’s support for the government during periods of 
unrest, which was typically offered on the condition that the government adhered to the 
rule of law. 
 
Members of the zemstvos, while appreciating the need for repression to pacify the 
country, did not always support the government unconditionally. This lack of a 
consensus can be most clearly demonstrated in a summary of the political parties in 
Russia. The zemstvo delegates were described as ‘anxious to find some means of saving 
their property and position from the impending danger’.56 This represents some 
indication of support for repressive measures, especially in the countryside where 
                                                     
56 TNA, FO 881/8669, no 159, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 3 December 1905, 134. 
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landlord property had been threatened. This should be qualified by a subsequent report 
by Spring Rice in December, who reported that any support for the government, 
garnered by the utility of repression, did not come on an unconditional basis. 
 
All were sensible of the fact that the country was drifting into a state of anarchy, and that 
energetic action was imperative; but only a small minority favored the unconditional 
support of the government. These were mainly land-owners whose properties were 
affected by the agrarian disorders.57 
 
The evidence from the November zemstvo congress, which was dominated by conflict 
between the Kadet party and the Octobrists, indicates that although there was an 
awareness of the need for repression, this did not translate into political support for the 
government. 
 
In fact, further evidence of the opinions of the zemstvos towards the end of 1905 
indicates that support for the government was at a particularly low point. The zemstvo 
delegates at the November congress, whilst supporting the government in its attempts to 
instill order on the countryside,  
 
were filled with apprehension at the idea that they would be on record as endorsing the 
acts of government. This would... encourage the government to believe that they could do 
what they liked in the security of finding themselves supported by the representatives of 
Russian Liberalism.58 
 
The Times correspondent to Russia also reported that at the November zemstvo 
congress did not offer its support for the government, and was critical of the 
governments repressive policies. ‘The attack being mainly directed against repression in 
Poland, the dispatch of aides-de-camp to cope with the agrarian troubles...’59  Similarly, 
Spring Rice reported the delegates, whilst betraying distrust for the government, showed 
a ‘reluctance to declare openly against it’.60 These passages suggest that governmental 
repression was not completely accepted by the zemstvos, even where it was seen to be 
necessary. This lack of consensus at zemstvo congresses on the use of field courts-
martial was similarly observable at the zemstvo congress in June 1907, which was 
dominated by the reactionary United Nobility. The Times reported that although there 
                                                     
57 TNA, FO 881/8669, no 137, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 1 December 1905, 109. 
58 TNA, FO 881/8669, no 133, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 29 November 1905, 104. 
59 ‘The Condition of Russia. Prospects of Reform, the Zemstvo Congress at Moscow’, The Times, 
November 21 1905, 5. 
60 TNA, FO 881/8669, no 159, Spring Rice to Lansdowne, 133. 
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were many speeches in favor of military courts-martial, ‘many moderates opposed their 
re-imposition, or any appeal to the government to resort to repression’.61 
 
This evidence regarding the lack of consensus in zemstvo records indicates that the 
recognition that repression was a necessity did not on its own engender support for the 
government. Issues of trust arose from the government’s widespread use of repressive 
measures, which resulted in the belief that the government was insincere about the 
wider reform of the political system that the zemstvo rank and file was supportive of.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the zemstvo rank and files’ attitudes towards repression demonstrates the 
importance that was attached to the maintenance of law and order and the exercise of 
legality by the government, rather than humanitarian concerns about the brutality of 
repression. In contradiction to Manning’s thesis of the shift to the right, the zemstvo 
rank and file became more critical of government repression during 1906. A significant 
qualitative shift occurred from 1905 to 1906, whereby repression was condemned by the 
zemstvo rank and file on the basis of its arbitrary nature and the resulting cessation of 
the operation of normal law in the countryside. This becomes evident in the southern 
provinces where approval in 1905 turned to criticism in 1906, and in the provinces 
where criticisms were sustained from 1905 to 1906. It also finds resonance in the wider 
political discourse of the period, suggesting that the observable trends in the southern 
provinces detailed by Bosanquet had a wider applicability. This suggests that the 
importance of the operation of the due process of law and legal standards took its 
precedent from the government repression that was unleashed in the countryside. 
 
These findings cannot entirely debunk the model proposed by Manning that peasant 
disturbances resulted in a reactionary movement amongst the zemstvo rank and file. 
Other research has shown that the peasant violence did have a certain impetus in the 
development of reactionary tendencies in both provincial and district zemstvos,62 and it 
is clear that criticisms of repression was not usually based upon humanitarian concerns, 
such as the hardship caused by troops burning down a peasant village. This is further 
supported by the widespread recognition of the utility of repression in the southern 
                                                     
61 ‘The Zemstvo Congress and Reform’, The Times, June 27 1907, 5. 
62 Rawson, ‘Rightist Politics’, 103; Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 179. 
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provinces, and how this was very similar to recognitions of the utility of repression in 
putting down urban strikes and the Moscow insurrection. The way that repression was 
seen as being useful for protecting the provincial status quo is therefore significant, and 
certainly could have sown the seeds of reactionary attitudes in the zemstvos. However, 
the recognition of the short term utility of repression played a wider role in zemstvo 
protest by creating a lack of consensus on the position to be taken against the 
government in official outlets of opinion, such as zemstvo minutes and resolutions. This 
suggests that liberal attitudes that placed importance on the rule of law in the 
countryside played a much wider role in the opinion of the zemstvo rank and file than 
has been previously thought. 
 
As I have demonstrated above, the operation of law and due process were important 
factors in how the Zemstvo Constitutionalists and the rank and file conceptualized 
constitutional society. Research into the supposed shift to the right indicates that it was 
a trigger for a wider expression of constitutionalism.  Because the impetus for reform 
came from the repression carried out by the state in the countryside that ignored the 
operation of common law, zemstvo protest can be viewed as an expression of the 
zemstvo rank and file attempting to define their relationship with the government in the 
provinces. 
  
CONCLUSION  
 
 
The members of the provincial and district zemstvos that were not represented among 
the members of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists represented a very broad group with 
many differing political opinions about the fate of Russia’s political system. Be that as 
it may, the preceding investigation into the political opinions of these members of the 
zemstvo rank and file on the subjects of land, representation, civil rights and repression 
can be used to reach some conclusions about how this group envisaged a constitutional 
regime in Russia. These findings will then be considered in light of the thesis of the 
shift to the right, which has dominated the historiography of the involvement of the 
zemstvos in politics both during the revolution of 1905-7 and in Russian politics up to 
the outbreak of the First World War. 
  
The crucial factor behind the political thinking of the members of the zemstvos was 
their positions in the countryside. As a result, the peasantry figured heavily in the 
political demands of the zemstvo rank and file. This was clearly demonstrated through 
the zemstvo rank and file’s demands for agrarian reform. Land expropriation was 
opposed by the zemstvo rank and file due to how they perceived peasant agriculture to 
be in a state of crisis, due to the lack of respect that the peasant had towards individual 
initiative and self-reliance in the countryside. The reasons for this were placed on the 
defective structures of peasant life, such as the commune, and credit institutions. 
Reform to the countryside was cast in terms of strengthening the self-reliance of the 
peasantry in order to create an active and engaged citizenry, a goal that betrays 
similarities with Russian liberal discourses at the time.  
 
The analysis of the zemstvo rank and file’s attitudes towards the land question, and the 
emphasis that they placed upon the fostering of individuality among the peasantry is 
observable in the arguments that they advanced against the relative weight that the 
peasantry were given in the electoral system of the first two Dumas. The poorly 
developed concept of individuality among the peasantry is also evident in the zemstvo 
rank and file’s conception of the peasantry’s political sophistication and maturity. Due 
to the fact that the development of political expression had been hamstrung by 
restrictions put in place by the state throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the zemstvo rank and file believed that the peasantry did not possess the sufficient 
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political maturity in order to participate constructively in the Duma. The zemstvo rank 
and file cited the peasantry’s perceived use of the Duma as a vehicle to obtain land due 
to the agricultural crisis as a key indicator of the peasantry’s political immaturity.  As a 
result, the zemstvo rank and file believed they became easily influenced by 
revolutionary parties that had little intention of constructively participating in the Duma, 
and revolutionary agitators who promised them land. 
 
For the zemstvo rank and file, the Duma represented a different prospect to the Duma 
envisaged by the Kadet party. Instead of an institution that would make radical reforms, 
the zemstvo rank and file considered the Duma to represent an institution that would 
facilitate the process of gradual political modernization of Russia, as well as providing 
the stability that moderate reform was seen to engender. This is further supported by the 
concept of universal and direct suffrage, which would greatly favor the peasant 
population over the landed gentry, being seen as an eventual goal that the process of 
political modernization would enable. This conflicted directly with Kadet politics, 
which aimed to force the government’s hand through gaining peasant support for their 
proposals to achieve sweeping reforms overnight.1  
 
The modernization of the Russian peasantry was similarly important in concerns raised 
in the provinces regarding the government’s use of arbitrary powers in order to quell 
unrest. The attitudes of the zemstvo rank and file in the southern provinces 
demonstrates that the utility of repression was appreciated in instilling order in the 
countryside. However, the overall picture of the zemstvo rank and file’s criticisms of 
repression indicates that the government’s use of arbitrary powers was not seen as 
conducive to the modernization of Russia’s citizenry that agricultural reform and the 
restricted assembly were to bring about. It damaged the relationship between the 
government and the rest of the population and discouraged the development of the 
respect for reciprocal rights and obligations that citizens in a constitutional regime 
possessed relative to the state. This was brought about by the government ignoring due 
process and infringing upon the jurisdiction of the independent judiciary through their 
use of emergency laws that sanctioned the use of military courts martial to try civilians.  
 
This can be further developed by a detailed analysis in the shifting of opinions on the 
use of repression among the zemstvos of the southern provinces of Russia. Although 
                                                     
1 Ascher, The Revolution of 1905 vol. 2, 369. 
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official zemstvo records suggested that the zemstvos stayed quiet on the issue of 
repression in 1906, analysis of the successive tours of the southern provinces by the 
British vice-consul to Odessa, V. H. Bosanquet, indicates that repression was criticized 
more vociferously in 1906 due to the problems it was likely to cause in the countryside, 
which had many similarities with the problems that the government’s arbitrary violation 
of civil rights was seen to engender. While the action of troops acting within the law to 
restore legal order was generally viewed as constructive, troops sent to country districts 
were commonly criticized for overstepping their remits and acting with unnecessary 
brutality. The lack of criticism in 1906 in zemstvo records therefore emerged due to a 
lack of consensus on how repression was viewed by the zemstvos, due to the 
recognition of the utility of repression in restoring order to the countryside and 
protecting the privileged positions of the zemstvo rank and file. This lack of consensus 
is detectable in wider discourses about the applicability of repression to the Russian 
countryside. 
 
The implications of these findings suggest that the rejection of the Kadet party by the 
zemstvos was less to do with a turn to reactionary politics than has previously been 
thought. It is clear that the zemstvos engaged in discourses throughout the revolution as 
to the shape of constitutionalism in Russia and its implementation. Kadet policies were 
not beyond the pale politically. This research has shown that the zemstvos supported 
concepts such as a strong, affluent peasantry, a broad basis of representation, and 
respect for civil rights. Instead of rejecting liberalism, this research indicates that the 
zemstvo rank and file possessed a more cautious attitude to the implementation of a 
constitutional regime due to what they felt to be the weakness of notions of citizenry in 
the countryside.  The zemstvo rank and file differed from the Kadets in terms of the 
timescale in which they envisaged the reforms could be implemented, favoring gradual 
reform that would reinforce notions of citizenry in the peasantry, rather than the 
overnight reform advocated by the Kadets. 
 
This research also suggests that peasant unrest and their engagement in the Duma 
reinforced the zemstvos’ views on the subject of gradual liberal reform, rather than 
resulting in a rejection of liberalism. This is especially pertinent in the analysis of the 
zemstvo rank and file’s reaction to the widespread arbitrary actions of the Russian 
government in the period. Even in the face of widespread peasant unrest, which posed 
imminent danger to their estates, the rank and file largely remained committed to the 
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concepts of due process and legality. Peasant intransigence in the first two Dumas 
reinforced the belief that the peasantry were not politically aware enough to participate 
constructively in the Duma, resulting in calls to restrict the assembly. However, in 
favoring the maintenance of the Duma rather than its destruction, the zemstvo rank and 
file was committed to a constitutionalist regime comprised of active citizens that was 
fundamentally different to pre 1905 standards. 
 
The basis for much of these political demands among the zemstvos stemmed from a 
patronizing opinion of the peasant population. What therefore emerges is a distorted 
picture of the peasant population that did not necessarily conform to reality, such as the 
poor opinion of peasant agricultural techniques, and the detrimental impact of the 
commune. The peasantry’s disinterest in the Duma was also somewhat unfairly 
highlighted. What this indicates is a sense of group superiority that was pervasive 
among the landed gentry who were represented in the zemstvos, and not the actual 
conditions of the Russian countryside. 
 
How far these demands stemmed from self-interest or altruism is complex, and should 
be viewed in terms of the zemstvo rank and file’s socioeconomic background. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century the zemstvo rank and file became increasingly 
marginalized, with considerable amounts of noble held land being sold to the peasants, 
and the increasing number of zemstvo employees threatening their privileged positions 
in the zemstvos.2 As a result of the electoral law to the first Dumas the landed gentry in 
the zemstvos felt increasingly marginalized in a sea of peasant voters.3 Zemstvo 
opposition to land expropriation may well have been due to economic self-interest, as 
well as their opposition to the broadening of the franchise. However, these demands 
were coupled with proposals to improve the economic wellbeing and political 
understanding of the peasantry, which indicates that the zemstvos were self-interested 
only insofar as they regarded themselves to be bastions of citizenship in the countryside, 
and were open to the idea of an economically strong peasantry aware of their rights and 
obligations under a constitutionalist regime. 
 
                                                     
2 On the loss of land see Hamburg, ‘The Russian Nobility on the Eve of the Revoluton’, 327; Becker, 
Nobility and Privilege, 29; on the threat of the Third Element, see Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, 
193-4. 
3 Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties, 103. 
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The significance of the zemstvo rank and file’s commitment to a cautious, modernizing 
liberalism lies in the potential for the government to cooperate with wider society that 
the development of liberal political thought among the zemstvos during the revolution 
of 1905-1907 engendered. Instead of following the lead of the parties of the right, who 
were suspicious of reforms that curtailed the prerogatives of the monarch, and aimed to 
constrain the Duma to a purely consultative assembly,4 the zemstvo rank and file 
recognized the need for liberal reform. The rejection of major reforms by interests on 
the right such as the United Nobility has been cited as major reasons for the failure of 
reform in the period 1907-1914. Peter Stolypin, due to his agrarian policies while 
serving as the Russian Prime Minister from 1906 to 1911, alienated large groups of 
landowners, while Waldron has contended that the United Nobility and the Orthodox 
Church were to blame for the failure of the majority of Stolypin’s reform program.5   
 
This research can offer a more optimistic picture of the ability of the government to 
cooperate with groups that have usually been considered to have been opposed to any 
reformist tendencies in the Russian government. The position of the zemstvo rank and 
file is arguably comparable to the political position of Stolypin, who attempted to 
modernize the countryside through the abandonment of the commune, as well as 
making the Duma more restrictive in order to improve its productivity. The zemstvo 
rank and file after 1906, although they repudiated the Kadet leadership of their 
movement, represented a key prospect for the cooperation between civil society and 
government in Russia up to the First World War.
                                                     
4 Peter Waldron, ‘Late Imperial Constitutionalism’, in I Thatcher (ed.), Late Imperial Russia; Problems 
and Prospects: Essays in Honour of R. B. Mckean (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 32. 
5 Sarah Badcock, ‘Autocracy in Crisis: Nicholas the Last’, in I Thatcher (ed.), Late Imperial Russia; 
Problems and Prospects: Essays in Honour of R. B. Mckean (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2005), 21; Waldron, ‘Late Imperial Constitutionalism’, 33. 
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